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Commitment, Liquidity and Control in Business Organizations
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
In this dissertation I reflect on business organizations, as ways to legally orga-
nize economic activities. In Chapter 1, I build on extant literature to define a theory
of business organizations that is orthogonal and complementary to the theory of the
firm. The central question this theory addresses is: What legal form should a firm
take? I argue that the “property turn” that has characterized recent advancements in
the theory of the firm has yet to fully take place in the theory of business organiza-
tions and attempt to make several steps in that direction. In particular, I show that a
central issue for organizations is whether the capital provided by investors is com-
mitted for the long period or not. Different organizational forms are characterized
by different levels of commitment. Historically, the enforceability of commitments
to invest for the long was slow to be granted and involved politically-charged pro-
cess. Once established, long-term commitment of capital unleashed a series of
developments that are now well understood to characterize modern markets.
In Chapter 2, I build on these ideas to propose a formal model of the com-
mitment of capital for the long term. In the model, two organizational forms are
contrasted: one with short-term capital (a “partnership”) and one with capital com-
mitted for the long term (a “corporation”). By starting from this basic difference, I
show that a series of implications follow. In particular, investors in the corporation
have to compensate the loss of liquidity entailed by the long-term commitment with
a more liquid market for shares ex post. In turn, liquidity in the market depends en-
dogenously on the degree of asymmetric information that characterizes trade. Thus,
for the commitment of capital to be sustainable, shares have to be liquid, which in
turn implies that shareholders need to be (in expectation) relatively uninformed so
that outside (fully uninformed) investors do not demand too large a discount when
purchasing their shares.
This mechanism yields implications for the typical size of different organiza-
tional forms, with corporations faring better than partnerships in terms of share
value when the number of equity holders is large, and vice versa when it is small.
In addition, the separation between ownership and control in large corporations,
which is typically seen with preoccupation, emerges endogenously from the model
as a necessary feature that guarantees liquidity in the secondary market and, in turn,
increases share value in the primary market.
In Chapter 3, I apply the model to shed light on the regulation of exit. The
commitment of financial resources to a project is essential for long-term investment
but brings about both a loss of control and a loss of liquidity for investors. There-
fore, investors are ordinarily given an exit option. In this chapter, I contrast three
common ways to exit: tradability of one’s equity position, liquidation rights and
redemption rights. I show that they balance liquidity and control very differently.
Large safe projects are better associated with tradability, because the risk of inef-
ficient continuation is low and the market provides enough liquidity. Small risky
projects are better associated with redemption rights, because they can sort inef-
ficient liquidations from inefficient continuations. Liquidation rights are desirable
when redemption rights fail because of high costs of capital or the risk of runs on
the company’s cash.
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1 The Theory of Business Organizations
Abstract
This chapter introduces a property-rights theory of business organizations
and contrasts it with the contractual theory that has dominated scholarship in
law, economics and finance since the 70s. Since firms can take different orga-
nizational forms, this chapter also discusses how the theory of business orga-
nizations relates to the property-rights theory of the firm. It will be shown that
these two theories, although complementary, are based on different notions of
property rights. The chapter further unpacks the fundamental features of busi-
ness organizations examining their origins, historical evolution and functions
in western economies. Two stereotypical organizational forms—the partner-
ship and the corporation—will take center stage in the analysis as two different
degrees of separation between the business and its owners. Finally, the chapter
examines how the organizational form a firm takes affects its relationship with
creditors in case of default and contractual counterparts in case of transfer of
essential assets, thus shaping the way in which firms borrow on and trade their
assets.
Keywords: theory of the firm, legal entity, legal personality, nexus of contracts,
capital lock-in.
JEL codes: G30, K22.
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1.1 Introduction
The last half a century of research has produced a greatly influential scholarship on
business organizations. Yet, while the theory of the firm has clarified the alloca-
tion of the rights to control strategic firm assets within economic enterprises, there
has been no comparable effort to understand how businesses are legally organized.
Basic questions such has those addressing the difference between firms organized
as partnerships and firms organized as corporations have largely gone unanswered.
Similarly, while corporate finance has yielded a comprehensive theory of debt, to
date we still know preciously little about equity.1 At a very fundamental level:
Why does equity have such long—mostly indefinite—maturity while being often
characterized by little power to control management? In this chapter, I show that
these features of the current theorizing about business organizations have a com-
mon root in the purely-contractual approach that, with only few notable exceptions,
has dominated scholarship since the seventies. I will leverage on these exceptions
to build a property-rights theory of business organizations and show its potential for
addressing fundamental, unanswered questions.
In the dominant view, corporations—and, by reflection, also other organiza-
tional forms—are little more than a nexus of several contracts among the indi-
viduals—owners, managers, creditors, employees, suppliers, customers and oth-
ers—who form and interact with the organization. This view originates from Jensen
and Meckling (1976), who argued that organizations could be understood as com-
1See Bolton (2014) for a review of the literature and an assessment.
2
plex contractual webs aimed at solving agency problems among the individuals
involved and, in particular, between those taking strategic decisions (management)
and those with claims on the organization’s profits (owners and creditors). This per-
spective goes hand in hand with a second, equally powerful notion proposed earlier
by Berle and Means (1932): the fact that ownership and control are starkly sepa-
rated in large corporations. The combination of these two ideas has been the canon
for economists and legal scholars for decades and has given rise to a large and im-
portant literature on corporate governance, studying ways to design organizations
so as to limit principal-agent problems (for a review, see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
The impact of this approach and its importance for modern scholarship cannot be
overstated.
For all its merits, however, reducing organizations to contracts obfuscates two
important aspects of the problem, both of which will play a central role in the
present analysis. First, it neglects the problems arising with third parties who were
extraneous to the original contract, privity being a fundamental principle in contract
law. Second, it frames the problem largely in terms of default rules that the parties
can adjust at their convenience and hence reduces organizational law to a menu of
default—hence customizable—contractual arrangements. Although largely correct,
this approach underplays the role of mandatory (unmodifiable) rules. In this view,
there is little or nothing that the law does to shape organizations.
A contractual view of organizational and, in particular, corporate law is not
incorrect but a merely contractual approach would be, both doctrinally and histori-
cally. Almost two millennia ago, the jurist Gaius (in Digest 3.4.1pr.) stressed that
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it was a prerogative of the state to give “corporate status” to selected bodies, which
were to be understood as pools of assets, not as collections of individuals. Most
telling is one of the examples of corpora in the Roman law: estates opened but not
yet distributed to the heirs, which were pools of assets with temporarily no relation
to any living individual (see Robbe, 1975). Organizational law is best understood as
a set of property-like arrangements—creating rights in rem, that is, rights attached
to assets—in addition to through the contract lens—focusing on rights in personam,
that is, creating obligations among individuals.
The theory of the firm has long recognized the importance of property rights for
understanding economic enterprises. The property turn in the theory of the firm,
however, did not translate automatically into a similar revolution in understanding
how such enterprises are legally organized. The reason is twofold. First of all, a
firm and its legal organization are typically not overlapping notions. A firm could
be and often is organized in different legal entities and, conversely, an entity could
be a legal umbrella for several firms. Laws dealing with fundamental issues, such
as bankruptcy and the assignment of contracts, do not apply directly to firms, they
apply to legal entities. Second, property may seem a clear-cut concept; it is not. A
theory of business organizations built on property rights requires a preliminary clar-
ification of what property is. Most importantly, the present analysis will leverage
on a notion of property that is markedly different from and complementary to the
one advanced in the theory of the firm.
As a first step, we need to clarify in what sense “property” is different from
“contract”. This is not a trivial exercise and it will help us appreciate the difference
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between economic activities run in a business organization (as in Coase, 1937) ver-
sus those supported by a (relational) contract (as in Goetz and Scott, 1981). There
are (at least) three commonly used definitions of property (and contract) that have
contributed profoundly to economic theory in the last several decades. Disentan-
gling them is important insofar as different notions of property play a role at dif-
ferent junctures of the theory laid out in this chapter. Section 1.1.1 discusses these
notions of property and lays the foundations of the theory. Section 1.2 reviews the
theory of the firm, emphasizing both its property-like foundations and its limited
expandability to the study of business organizations.2 Section 1.3 illustrates how
the fundamental features of legal entities in general—and of the corporate form in
particular—can be understood through a property lens. Section 1.4 zeroes in on the
most fundamental feature of the corporate form: the lock-in of capital for the long
term. This section connects the theory of business organizations to an embryonic
theory of equity. Section 1.5 investigates the implications of the theory in two cases
concerning the way in which organizations raise capital through debt (and may fail
to repay it) and transfer their essential assets, respectively. After having stressed the
importance of organizational law as a set of rules that applies essentially to assets,
in Section 1.6 I bring individuals back into the picture, connecting the theory with
the contractual view. In advocating for a “property turn” in the theory of business
organizations I hope both to push the theory of business organizations forward and
to bring it closer to its historical roots.
2For an analysis of how the theory of the firm can be used to illuminate the study of organizational
law see Armour and Whincop (2007).
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1.1.1 The economics of property rights
In the literature, the term “property” is used to refer to several different notions.
This section focuses on three approaches: property as protection against expropria-
tion from powerful groups, property as unified ownership of complementary assets,
and property as a right that runs with the assets. We will focus in particular on what
distinguishes property from contract.3
Property as stable ownership A commonly-used and powerful definition views
property rights as rights that are protected against expropriation powerful individ-
uals, in the tradition of North and Weingast (1989). This perspective goes beyond
the distinction between default and mandatory rules. Private individuals cannot
negotiate around mandatory rules—while they can do so with default rules—but
legislators have the power to amend even mandatory rules. In contrast, the idea
behind property rights protection comprises constraints on expropriation that are
embedded in a series of institutions (like the “constitution”) that cannot be easily
dismissed by the elite. Property, in this view, is a set of constitutionally protected
mandatory rules.
A notable application of this idea can be found in Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005), where the authors “unbundle” property and contract by defining the first
as a set of institutions that protect individuals’ private property against expropria-
tion by powerful elites and the second as a set of default rules around which indi-
3This section is arguably as much about contract as it is about property, since the focus is the
distinction between them. Yet, the narrative focuses on property because it is instrumental to the
next sections, which build on it.
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viduals can negotiate. From this perspective, property solves problems associated
with the fact that contract rights can be negotiated around, reneged and violated. In
line with Coase (1960), the authors show that rights that cannot be altered through
negotiation have a deeper impact on the economy than negotiable rights. In legal
scholarship, these notions find a parallel in the view that property law is a set of
rules designed to maximize the value of ownership while minimizing the costs of
defending against challengers Bell and Parchomovsky (2005, with a review of the
literature).
These ideas play an important role in political economics and development and
stress the fundamental observation that property rights are, in a broad sense, as a
set of institutions that constrain rulers and other potential takers.4 While important
and influential, this view of property differs drastically from the two definitions that
follow, which are based on an “horizontal” view of property, that is, on a notion of
property grounded on how an individual relates to other private individuals.
Property as a residual control right A second way to define property is to view
it as the owner’s residual right to control assets, after rights assigned to others by
contract have been satisfied. This is the definition on which Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) built the now standard theory of the firm. The
crucial observation is that, since contracts are inherently incomplete, it is virtually
impossible to specify rights under all contingencies by contract and, hence, there
will always be some residual contingencies that have escaped specification. If one
4A fascinating application of this idea to the ancient world can be found in Fleck and Hanssen
(2006). For a review of the literature on property rights see Besley and Ghatak (2012).
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of these contingencies materializes, then the individual who holds the property right
on the asset is in control of it. In short, property is designed to solve the problems
arising from incomplete contracts (Barzel, 1997).
In legal scholarship, this approach finds a parallel in the literature on commons
versus anticommons (starting with Hardin, 1968; Heller, 1998; Heller and Eisen-
berg, 1998), which shows that residual rights to use and exclude others from us-
ing complementary assets should be under unified ownership. In particular, Parisi
(2002) has argued that property is subject to an inevitable transition towards higher
entropy, because it is easy for a unified owner to fragment property by selling par-
tial rights to different buyers, while holdup makes it very costly for a next potential
owner to re-unify property by buying back the pieces. The need to counter this
process and keep complementary assets under unified control is said to justify fun-
damental differences between property and contract and, in particular, the fact that
only a limited number of rights (a numerus clausus of them) can be qualified as
property rights and is protected by a property rule, that is, violations are prevented
by injunctive remedies and, if they occur, they are undone Calabresi and Melamed
(1972).
Contract law scholarship, however, has emphasized that, while contracts may
be incomplete ex ante, they will necessarily be completed ex post by the court,
if disagreement results in litigation. Contract law (not property law) defines the
courts’ interpretive and gap-filling functions (Goetz and Scott, 1985; Scott, 2006).
In addition, the assumption that parties cannot write a complete contract does not
account for the fact that contracts are, often, deliberately incomplete (Scott, 2003;
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Choi and Triantis, 2010). In the next section, it will be illustrated how the notion of
property that is standard in legal scholarship differs from the one described here.
Property as a right in rem Neither of the definitions provided above fully ac-
counts for the way in which legal scholars have traditionally seen property. His-
torically, the preoccupation with contracts has been due to privity. In principle, a
contract between A and B has no effects for C. Similarly a contract between A and
C has no effects for B. What happens if it is impossible to enforce both contracts
at the same time, that is, if these two contracts are incompatible? For instance, A
could have sold the same asset both to B and to C; who is then the owner of the
asset, B or C? The answer is typically to be found in property law. Differently
from contractual rights, property rights are erga omnes—that is, they apply also
to third parties, as emphasized by Merrill and Smith (2000)—and in rem—that is,
they are attached to assets and not to particular individuals and hence run with the
asset irrespective of the asset owners, as emphasized by Hansmann and Kraakman
(2002).
In this view, property solves the problems arising from incompatible (as op-
posed to incomplete) contracts. This is a fundamental problem in property law, in
light of the fact that ownership has a sequential structure. The current owner’s right
depends on the previous owner’s right, which in turn depends on a previous owner’s
right and so forth until the chain of transfers can be traced back to an original ac-
quisition. At any juncture in the chain of transfers, mistakes, abuses or theft could
create a bifurcation resulting in two competing claims on the same asset arising.
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Every legal system has developed (property) institutions to deal with and alleviate
similar problems, such as property and business registries (Arrunada, 2012; Bell
and Parchomovsky, 2016).
Yet, the problem is more general.5 Consider for instance a borrower A who
pledges the same assets to B and to C or, as in Ayotte and Bolton (2011), a borrower
A who promises to B that she will not borrow from C. Yet, she eventually does so
and then fails to repay. How are the rights on A’s assets to be allocated between
B and C? This example shows that this definition of property does not apply only
to physical assets. A general problem arises from the fact that contracting parties
(say, A and B) cannot perfectly and costlessly give notice to third parties (say C) of
their contractual arrangements, which could later enter into a contract with one of
the original parties (say, A). This possibility gives rise to a trade-off. Upholding the
rights of the contract that was first in time (B’s contract) could create problems for
innocent third parties (C) who enter into an incompatible contract at a later time.
Vice versa, protecting the rights arising from the later contract (C’s contract) would
open the door for strategic behavior (to the detriment of B).
Property as right in rem addresses problems arising from incompatible rights
that different contracts assign to different individuals; more generally, property de-
fines rights that are valid irrespective of express agreements and hence requires
supporting institutions that address the problem of notice. This notion of property
is essential for understanding organizational law.
5For an overview of several scenarios in which this problem may arise see Dari-Mattiacci and
Guerriero (2015).
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1.2 The theory of the firm
This section introduces the theory of the firm,6 which addresses the question of
what distinguishes organizations from arm’s length transactions. The incipit for
this inquiry is generally attributed to Coase (1937), who noted that economic theory
of his time made no difference between individuals and firms acting in the market,
although the latter might reach impressive size and encompass the work of hundreds
or even thousands of individuals. Coase noted that one of the key characteristics of
firms was that parts of the production process where removed from the market and
dealt with within. Identifying which transactions are better dealt with inside the
firm and which in the marketplace would then lead to a theory of why firm exists
and when they are more efficient than market transactions.
Coase argued that firms are there to economize on transaction costs—that is,
the costs of using the market to complete transactions—at the price of incurring
organizational costs. Firms grow up to the point that internal organization costs rise
above the transaction costs saved. However, an important source of both transaction
and organization costs is the fact that the principal has limited control over the agent.
The degree of control that a firm has on its employees is not necessarily greater that
the degree of control that a buyer exercises on a seller in the market. For instance,
a large buyer may exert more power on a small-scale seller than an employer on
her employee. Therefore, it is difficult to make sense of organizations as ways to
replace market transactions with some form of control within a hierarchy, as control
6For a review of the literature see Holmström and Tirole (1989) and Foss, Lando, and Thomsen
(2000).
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can be exerted also in the market.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) noted these limitation in Coase’s approach and
proposed to think of firms as ways to manage teams. Team production is problem-
atic because marginal contributions are difficult to measure. Thus, the team—that
is, the firm—hires a monitor whose task is to reward effort by team members.
Holmstrom (1982) showed that the monitor cannot give each team member his
marginal product if the budget has to be balanced, but in a firm third parties inject
capital, so that employees do not need to balance their budget. Along these lines,
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) showed that a firm is preferable to a contract when
effort is multidimensional and some dimensions not measurable. The high-power
incentives provided by markets would not work well because employees would only
care about measurable dimensions. In contrast, in a firm, low-powered incentives
are used to incentives both measurable and non-measurable effort (see also Barzel,
1997).
The theories illustrated above share a view of firms as ways to solve market fail-
ures (Arrow, 1969, 1974). In fact, these theories do not show that contracts cannot
be engineered to support the mechanisms indicated above, such as, for instance,
that contracts cannot be designed to provide low-powered incentives. Is a firm just
a contract?
An alternative approach is to think of firms as ways to solve contract fail-
ures and, namely, contract incompleteness. Williamson (1971, 1975) identified the
source of contract incompleteness in the combination of bounded rationality and
uncertainty. In turn, an incomplete contract invites opportunism and hence gener-
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ates the need for an effective technology to enforce the agreement the parties had in
mind. An organization provides a sort of alternative enforcement system that may
work more flexibly and effectively than courts and hence could be better capable of
dealing with incomplete contracts. Transactions will be allocated inside or outside
the firm depending on which “contract law” is better between the one administered
by courts or the one administered by the manager. Essentially, however, this is a
theory of differential costs of writing and enforcing contracts inside and outside
the firm and hence reduces again the firm to a set of contractual arrangements and,
namely, to something analogous to an arbitration clause.
A radically different, and now standard, perspective on the problems arising
from incomplete contracts was provided by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990). The Grossman-Hart-Moore theory stems from the recognition
that contracts can be renegotiated so as to achieve the efficient outcome, and hence,
contrary to Williamson’s view, it is relatively unimportant which interpretation of
the contract a court would enforce ex post. Ex ante, however, a party expects to earn
a larger share of the joint surplus if it can steer renegotiation in her favor, securing
a larger slice of the pie. In turn, the expectation of larger ex post gains provides
incentives to make non-contractible investments ex ante. Since ex post bargaining
power crucially depends on a party’s control of essential firm assets—which confers
holdup power in renegotiation—asset ownership can be used to protect crucial ex
ante investments by giving the party making those investments greater bargaining
power ex post.
What sets this theory apart from all previous approaches is the fact that the firm
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is explicitly defined as a pool of assets (Grossman and Hart, 1986), rather than as
a group of individuals. This is a fundamental intellectual step. Specific rights over
firm assets can be assigned by contract, but any right that is not specifically assigned
pertains to the asset owner. From this perspective, property confers the residual
rights to control the assets after all contractually assigned rights have been enforced.
Since contracts are naturally incomplete, it is impossible to specify control rights by
contract under all circumstances and hence there will be a residual set of rights that
pertains to the asset owner. It is thus relevant how property rights over firm assets
are allocated. Quite differently from Berle and Means (1932), in this approach
ownership is control.
In the model, at date 0 parties make ex ante investments, at date 1 they make
management decisions, then (private) benefits are realized. Investments, decisions
and profits are not contractible at date 0, but decisions can be costlessly renegoti-
ated at date 1. Therefore, the ex post allocation will be efficient and, hence, the
only problem is how to distribute the profits in a way that optimally incentivizes
ex ante investments. In a simple two-firm setting, there are three options: (1) no
integration, (2) firm 1 owns 2 and (3) firm 2 owns 1. The decision whether to in-
tegrate production in a single firm (and how) or to rely on a contract between firm
1 and firm 2 (option 1) depends on which party makes the most important ex ante
investment, which should be protected through asset ownership. The theory also
shows that complementary assets should be owned together, providing an alterna-
tive justification for vertical integration (the traditional explanation is based on the
need to prevent double markup: Cournot, 1838; Ellet, 1839)
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The Grossman-Hart-Moore theory of the firm is grounded in the view that a
firm is a pool of assets and that ownership gives residual control rights over those
assets. These premises are at odds with the nexus-of-contract approach to business
organizations, which views the firm as a group of individuals (Jensen andMeckling,
1976) and control as separate from ownership (Berle and Means, 1932). In the
next section, I will emphasize the property foundations of organizational law and
reconcile the theory of the firm with a theory of how firms are legally organized.
1.3 The corporation as a firm with “legal entity” status
Most continental legal systems treat corporations as “associations of capital”. The
notion could not be more starkly opposed to the nexus-of-contracts approach, which
stresses agency relationships among individuals. To some extent, this section de-
scribes how scholars thought of corporations before the onset of modern corporate
governance theory. The corporate form is just one of the many possible ways in
which a firm can be legally organized but it is useful to focus on it both for its
economic importance and because it helps illustrate the theory. As a comparison, I
will refer to the partnership as an alternative organizational form. There are many
differences between partnerships and corporations: I will focus on whether the or-
ganization can rely on permanent capital.
The discussion will zero in on the notion of legal entity (or legal personality),
what it entails and how it is achieved. Broadly speaking, the legal entity status
allows a corporation to behave as a “person” under the law. In turn, this feature
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requires, somewhat paradoxically, that the firm be “depersonalized”, that is, legally
detached from the individuals behind it. To provide a very sharp background for
the analysis, it is useful to conjecture how a firm would operate in a world in which
firms do not have relevance under the law, that is, where firms are reduced to a
simple contract among individuals. We will use this example to illustrate the com-
ponents of the corporate form introduced in the next section. Finally, we will inves-
tigate their historical emergence.
1.3.1 Elements of the corporate form and the role of law
In modern business organizations, to depersonalize business—that is, to detach a
pool of assets from the individuals behind it—the law provides a set of proprietary
rights that confer to an otherwise private contract effects that go beyond the parties
involved. Property here does not assign residual rights of control as in the theory
of the firm. Quite differently, this notion of property refers to rights in rem: rights
that run with the assets and are enforceable erga omnes, irrespective of whether an
individual was part in the original contract or not. As a result, potential conflicts
may arise between mutually incompatible contractual arrangements; one of the pri-
mary functions of property rights in these cases is to resolve those conflicts. We
will stress here the features of the corporate form and emphasize the difference be-
tween corporations and partnerships as two different degrees of separation between
the business organization and the individuals behind it.
Representation (agency). A business organization operates through the actions of
16
(human) actors. While in economics the focus is on the conflict of inter-
est and asymmetric information between the principal and the agent (Ross,
1973), in legal terms agency refers to the possibility for the agent to enter
into contracts on behalf of the principal, so that the principal, not the agent,
is a party in the contract. Agency law applies more generally, also covering
agency relationships between individuals. Yet, in the context of business or-
ganizations, agency is a crucial feature, as without it the organization cannot
operate. An agency relationship cannot be established by mere contractual
rights. A key element is the fact that the agency contract between the agent
and the principal produces effects for third parties who enter into contractual
relationships with the principal through the agent. The agency contract ap-
plies erga omnes, possibly to any party with whom the agent contracts. It
is important to stress that third parties were not part of the original contract
between the principal—that is, the organization—and the agent. The poten-
tial for incompatible contracts is evident. The agents may exceed the scope
of her mandate and make promises that the principal did not anticipate. In
this case, the contract between the agent and the principal conflicts with the
contract between the agent and a third party. The law of agency is precisely
the set of rules designed to address these conflicts. In this sense, agency law
defines property rights.
The next three features address together the problem of identifying a pool of assets
as the organization’s assets and disciplining claims on them. We will proceed by
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addressing three different sets of claims in turn: claims by business creditors of
the organizations, claims by personal creditors of the equity holders, claims by the
equity holders themselves. These features are proprietary in the sense that they
run with the business assets irrespective of a specific agreement with individual
creditors or equity holders.
Limited liability. Limited liability regulates claims by business creditors and lim-
its those claims to the organization’s assets, so that personal assets of the
equity holders cannot be attached by creditors of the organization. The pro-
prietary nature of this arrangement is most evident when considering invol-
untary creditors of the organizations, such as tort victims.
Entity shielding. Entity shielding (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000b; Hansmann,
Kraakman, and Squire, 2006) concerns the opposite problem and disciplines
personal creditors’ claims on the organization’s assets. The problem with
those claims is that the personal exposure of an individual equity holder to
debt makes the organization vulnerable to possibly inefficient liquidation.
Entity shielding may protect the organization’s assets more or less strongly.
Weak entity shielding simply gives business creditors priority over personal
creditors on firm assets. Strong entity shielding adds liquidation protection,
barring personal creditors from being able to force the liquidation of the com-
pany to satisfy their claims. This is the form of protection seen in corpora-
tions.7 Entity shielding can also be engineered to isolate different business
7A more extreme form is complete entity shielding, denying any claim on the organization’s
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units of a parent company from one another, so that the creditors of one unit
cannot attach the other unit’s assets or are subordinate to the other unit’s cred-
itors.
Capital lock-in. Shielding the organization from the personal creditors of the eq-
uity holders is not enough to guarantee that the organization’s capital be stable
over time. The equity holders themselves could be a substantial source of in-
stability depending on whether they—including, importantly, their heirs—retain
the right to withdraw capital from the organization. From a different angle,
the question is whether participation in a business organization is at will or
if equity holders commit their capital for a term, or indefinitely. At a very
general level, this is a—possibly, the most—fundamental difference between
a partnership and a corporation. Although a commitment for the short term
may be allowed, partnership do not have permanent capital and participation
is generally at will, which implies that individual partners retain the right to
withdraw their capital and possibly force the liquidation of the partnership.
Continental legal systems think of partnerships as “associations of persons”.
In contrast, capital in a corporation is generally committed indefinitely, so that
individual shareholders cannot withdraw their capital at will. In continental
legal systems, a corporation is a “association of capital”. Exit is possible only
through the sale of shares. However, note the important difference between
withdrawal, which deprives the organization of capital, and trade in shares,
assets by personal creditors; this is usually associated with nonprofit corporations and charitable
trusts.
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which only replaces one investor with another without affecting the organi-
zations’ assets. The commitment of capital is an in rem feature and it is thus
enforceable against heirs and other acquirers from the original equity holders.
Finally—and this is probably the most recognizable feature of the corporate form:
Tradable shares. Committing capital to a business entails a loss of liquidity for
investors. To compensate for it, the commitment of capital is usually paired
with share transferability, that is, the possibility to trade one’s position in the
organization on a market.8 The flip side of tradability is the acceptance, on the
part of the remaining shareholders, of a change in the identity of the trading
investor. Tradability can be free or limited by specific conditions, such as the
agreement of the other shareholders.
These features make it possible for a business organization to rely on a clearly iden-
tified and stable pool of assets, enter into contracts, own property and stand in court
independently and largely irrespective of the individuals behind the organization. In
theory, these features could be engineered in a multilateral contract between equity
holders, (potential) creditors, managers, buyers, sellers, and other parties expecting
to deal with the organization at some point in the future, including potential acquir-
ers from the equity holders and their heirs. The impracticability of such contract
is evident. A series of bilateral contracts runs the risk that two or more of these
contracts will conflict and hence cannot be simultaneously enforced. The role of
property rights in organizational law is to take over this coordination problem.
8But see Bolton and Samama (2013) for an analysis of restrictions on the
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Yet, property rights are not equally important in all cases mentioned above. For
instance, limited liability can in theory be achieved contractually by an agreement
between the creditor and the organization to the effect that the creditor’s rights are
limited to the organization’s assets at the cost of a higher cost of debt. Although
seemingly fundamental to the modern notion of business organizations, this feature
is both theoretically and, as we will see, historically of secondary importance when
it comes to voluntary creditors. (With involuntary creditors, such as tort victims,
the problem is of course different.) In contrast, entity shielding is of more central
importance than limited liability because it is much more difficult to establish by
contract. Since this provision limits the recourse rights of personal creditors, it
raises the cost of debt for the equity holders and hence is vulnerable to free-riding.
In a business organization with multiple equity holders, each equity holder has an
incentive to reduce her personal cost of debt by deviating from an hypothetical
agreement to shield the company from personal debts. This coordination problem
makes it unlikely that a business organization with entity shielding can be sustained
by contracts only and requires the law to step in and provide the necessary property
rights. In turn, entity shielding makes the organization’s assets more stable and less
vulnerable to liquidation, it lowers the cost of debt for the company and simplifies
monitoring by creditors—as they do not need to monitor the personal exposures of
individual equity holders (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000a,b).
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1.3.2 Firms without legal-entity status
To stress the importance of property rights in business organizations, it is instructive
to assume them away and follow the life of a firm constructed as a mere contract.
In fact, there is no need to conjecture a fictitious counterfactual world: firms oper-
ating under traditional Roman law were in this situation since the Roman law did
not grant the corporate form (or any other entity status) to private businesses (see
Abatino, Dari-Mattiacci, and Perotti, 2011). Analysis of this case will also provide
the starting point for the analysis of the evolution of the corporate form in the next
section.
How does a firm deal with its clients, creditors, debtors and equity holders in
such a world? Assume that, in the late Republican period—in the last two cen-
turies BC—two individuals called Emeritus and Ennius—“e” as in equity hold-
ers—jointly put some capital into a business venture, buy essential assets, hire
Marius—a manager—and incur debts with a creditor called Carus. All of them
are Roman citizens, have free status and are legally independent (paterfamilias);
under these conditions, they had full rights under the law.
To start with, imagine that Emeritus and Ennius send Marius to buy wine on
credit from Carus. In economic terms Marius is an agent of Emeritus and Ennius,
the principals, but his legal status is quite different. A practical question that needs
to be addressed is who owns the wine and who is Carus’ debtor. Ideally, we would
expect the firm—that is, the collection of Emeritus and Ennius—to acquire rights
and obligations from the transaction effected by Marius. However, the Roman law
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did not recognize the legal principle of agency. Therefore, the wine is owned by
Marius who also contracts a debt vis-à-vis Carus. In turn, Carus has no claim
against Emeritus and Ennius as they were not parts in the contract; if Marius does
not repay him, Carus cannot sue Marius’ principals. The problem is that the Roman
agency contract (mandatus) between the equity holders and their manager was lim-
ited by a strict application of the principle of privity of contracts and had no effects
for Carus, a third party external to that contract. It only regulated the relationship
between the principal and the agent.
To complete the transaction Marius needs to repay Carus, transfer the wine to
his principals, and claim from them what he paid to Carus. The lack of external
relevance for the agency contract creates both the need for additional transactions
and exposes both Marius and Carus to financial risks. In turn, Emeritus and Ennius
cannot commit through Marius to repay Carus.
To be sure, the situation would not be different if either Emeritus or Ennius went
directly to Carus to buy the wine. Although Ennius and Emeritus were parts to a
partnership contract (the societas), also this contract had purely private effects and
no relevance for third parties. From the perspective of Carus, a contract he has with,
say, Emeritus does not create liabilities or rights for Ennius and vice versa—that is,
there is no mutual agency. As a result, if one of the partners raises capital through
debt he only will be personally liable, but to what extent? The Roman law did
not recognize the principle of limited liability in this case and hence the partner
contracting debt will be unlimitedly liable. In turn, since the partnership contract
does not have any other effect than creating rights and obligations between Ennius
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and Emeritus, from the perspective of a third-party creditor there is no such a thing
as firm assets. There are only assets that are owned jointly by two individuals.
Thus, Carus can attach freely the “firm assets” limitedly to the part that belongs
to Emeritus in case Emeritus does not repay, and can attach other personal assets
Emeritus may have, without limitation. Carus cannot however attached Ennius’
share in the firm assets or any other asset he may have.
What if Ennius has a personal creditor, say, Camillus, whom he did not repay?
Since, again, the partnership contract had no external relevance, Camillus can attach
the share of the “firm assets” that belong to Ennius, even though Camillus is not a
creditor of the firm. The Roman law did not shield firm assets from the personal
creditors of the equity holders and hence firms faced a risk of liquidation whenever
one of the owners became insolvent. The lack of partitioning between personal and
firm assets is again the product of the fact that the partnership contract is just that,
a contract giving rise to purely contractual—in personam—rights.
What if Ennius needs to divest or, worse, dies? Since the partnership contract
was irremediably linked to the individuals that created it, if a partner died the con-
tract ceased to exit and the partnership was immediately dissolved. Heirs did not
inherit shares in the partnership, they inherited directly a share in the jointly owned
assets, outstanding credits and liabilities. Moreover, if Ennius suffers a liquidity
shock and needs capital, he cannot easily sell his “shares”. The process of replac-
ing Ennius with a new equity holder was complex and effectively required liqui-
dating the original partnership and creating a new one; not a smooth path. The
most straightforward way for Ennius to exit is to force the liquidation of the firm.
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Engrained principles of partnership and property law allowed him to do so at will.
Importantly, the Roman law did not enforce a commitment to remain in business
for the long term or indefinitely nor dit it enforce a commitment to own property
in common for the long term—which could be a way to sidestep the limitations of
partnership contracts.
To sum up, traditional principles of Roman law did not allow private parties
to set up a business with partitioned assets (including limited liability and entity
shielding), permanent capital, and tradable shares, which could act in the market
(and under the law) through agents. There were two notable exceptions to this
background set of rules. Partnerships set up by government leaseholders (societates
publicanorum) were—for a relatively short period of time at the end of the Repub-
lic—allowed a structure that, according to Malmendier (2005, 2009), resembled
closely that of modern corporations. These were, however, atypical businesses,
dealing almost exclusively with public procurements and hence exercising func-
tions, such as tax collection, public construction works, and supply for the army,
which were of clear public relevance.9
A second and, for our purposes, more relevant exception concerned businesses
run by slaves (Abatino, Dari-Mattiacci, and Perotti, 2011). Instead of hiringMarius,
a free man, Emeritus and Ennius could jointly purchase Marcipor, a slave. This was
a generally available solution, not limited to specific firms providing services to
9The mills of Toulouse provide a similar exceptional case for a much later period, in the first cen-
turies after the year 1000 (Sicard, 2015). Also in this case, those businesses were not purely private.
Rather they administered an important public utility and hence were not much different in function
from public institutions that were traditionally allowed the corporate form, such as municipalities,
hospitals and charities.
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the state. The mechanism through which those businesses operated is interesting
because it is both radically different and, in spirit, perfectly aligned with modern
instantiations. One or more private individuals interested in setting up a limited
liability company with a manager acting (from a legal point of view) as their agent
could jointly purchase a slave and endow him with dedicated assets, called the
peculium. They would then have to take some distance from management, which
often meant posting a sign that publicly warned third parties that the slave was
managing a business—for instance, a workshop—independently.
Slaves were considered objects under the law and hence could not enter into
contracts, own property or stand in court. Slowly, however, magistrates (the prae-
tores) started to extend some form of legal protection to individuals who dealt with
slaves, creating remedies such as the actio de peculio, which recognized the lia-
bility of slave masters for debts incurred by their slaves limitedly to the peculium
assets.10 Technically, those assets remained property of the masters, but since the
claims of the slave’s contractual parties were now enforceable in court against the
master, the slave could commit those assets by, for instance, borrowing on or selling
them. In turn, masters could delegate managerial decisions to slaves without fear of
being personally liable beyond what they had invested in the peculium.
Slave-run businesses had limited liability, could be managed by an agent (the
slave), and shares in them could be relatively easily traded because one of the mas-
ters could sell his property interest in the slave and the peculiumwithout causing the
10There were also other analogous cases in which slave creditors had actionable remedies, they
are discussed in Abatino, Dari-Mattiacci, and Perotti (2011).
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liquidation of the business. (However, slave-run businesses did not have permanent
capital and entity shielding.) What is interesting is that remedies such as the actio
de peculio created limited liability by, in fact, extending the liability of the master
for obligations contracted by a slave from null to a positive measure. In contrast,
modern implementations of limited liability entail a contraction of liability.
The way in which these features emerged in ancient Rome was surprisingly sim-
ple and leveraged, just like in modern entities, on the notion of property. The firm
was, from a legal point of view, a pool of assets; the peculiarity of this construction
was that the manager was one of those assets. The organization was therefore not
purely based on the partnership contract, which continued to have only internal ef-
fects; it was instead grounded on joint ownership of a slave and dedicated assets.
Business was depersonalized in ancient Rome by relying on a non-person (for the
law) to manage it.11
1.3.3 The historical evolution of corporate features
The traditional Roman principles that reduced business organizations to private
contracts served as the background legal principles for centuries after the fall of
the Roman Empire. The two exceptions illustrated above did not have any trace-
able influence in legal history. The societates publicanorum were lost as Rome
evolved away from its republican origins; emperors concentrated administrative
power and did not favorably see a role for large private organizations providing
public services (Malmendier, 2009). Slave-run businesses became unfeasible after
11For an analysis of incentives in the slave-master relationship see Dari-Mattiacci (2013).
27
the demise of large-scale chattel slavery. The modern version of the corporate form
slowly emerged through centuries of commercial practice an coalesced as a bundle
of features that developed at different speeds.
As economic activities and trade picked up during the middle ages, the possibly
least desirable feature of the Roman law was the strict adherence to the principle of
no representation, which severely constrained the ability of traders to act through
agents. Although this principle was clearly rejected in legal scholarship only in
1625 by Hugo Grotius in his De iure belli ac pacis (Zimmermann, 1996, 41-44), in
practice, courts and commercial communities had long before recognized the pos-
sibility that the agent could create legally binding commitments for the principal,
so that agency was a key feature of medieval businesses.
Rules allowing for asset partitioning also developed during the middle ages.
Limited liability for passive partners was a relatively uncontested possibility. Pro-
viding capital to a business without contributing to its management did not gener-
ally entail unlimited exposure to liabilities. In the Greco-Roman world the financ-
ing of maritime expeditions had long allowed for this option and analogous business
forms, like the commenda, were common in the middle ages both in the east and in
the west (Favali, 2004; Mignone, 2005).
Full limited liability of active partners in a private business enterprise emerged
first through a contractual rather than legal innovation. An early instantiation was
the limitation of the liability of the directors of the Dutch East India Company in
1623. Their exposure was already effectively limited by maritime law, which dealt
with liabilities arising from loss of cargo at sea, and the company’s 1602 charter,
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which had the force of an ad hoc law and regulated liabilities arising from obliga-
tions toward employees. Given the limited relevance of tort law for such businesses
in the 17th century, the only residual source of liability were company bonds. The
charter was silent about them and general principles implied that directors—that is,
the company’s managing partners—were personally liable for the company’s debt
(Gelderblom, de Jong, and Jonker, 2013). Contractual exposure, however, can be
limited by contract. Since charter renewals failed to do that, the company directors
simply wrote limited liability into the company bonds from 1623 on and the courts
enforced the new provision. Only later did the principle percolate into the law to
became a generally applicable feature of corporations (Punt, 2010).
In contrast, while entity shielding in its weak form—priority of firm creditors
over personal creditors on firm assets—could be found in medieval businesses at
least from the 13th century (Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, 2006), asset parti-
tioning, however, did not reach its full state until the 17th century and so did trad-
ability of shares. To be sure, although some businesses recognized the possibility
to trade shares, tradability requires a liquid stock market to be an effective option
and the first such market one did not emerge until the 17th century.
In fact, strong entity shielding and tradable shares could not emerge before an-
other fundamental change had taken place: the emergence of business organizations
with permanent capital. While public bodies, such as monasteries, universities, and
municipalities had long relied on permanent capital, the first private organizations
with the same long-term horizon were the East India companies in the Dutch Re-
public first and in England later, which obtained permanent capital in 1612 and
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1657, respectively. Overall, in a relatively short timespan in the beginning 17th
century, the Dutch Republic completed a long process of evolution of the features
of the corporate form. Two of them, agency and limited liability had evolved in
practice before being embedded in law. The remaining three features (strong entity
shielding, tradable shares and permanent capital) evolved at once as a result of one
particular legal innovation: the enforceability of a commitment to lock in capital
for the long term, which was introduced for the first time in Western legal history
in 1612 in the Dutch East India Company. We turn to this issue in the next section.
1.4 Capital lock-in and the separation between ownership and
control
When the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was chartered in Amsterdam in 1602,
the company could rely on agency and limited liability for passive investors, owing
to previous legal developments, and on a national monopoly for trade with Asia,
which was clearly defined in its charter. Conspicuously, the charter did not intro-
duce limited liability for active investors (the company directors), who remained
personally liable for company debts. In these respects, the VOC charter was almost
identical to the charter of its main competitor, the English East India Company
(EIC), chartered in 1600.
However, the two charters differed in a fundamental detail (Dari-Mattiacci et al.,
2017). In the EIC, the initial subscription was to finance one fleet for one voyage.
At the return of the fleet—mostly after two to three years for the EIC in this pe-
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riod—assets would be liquidated and profits distributed; only then, possibly, a new
subscription could be launched under the same umbrella. The VOC charter, instead,
provided for a ten-year maturity, after which liquidation and distribution would fol-
low. The difference was substantial, since it allowed the VOC to reinvest profits
from the initial voyages into subsequent ones. In 1612 the 10-year term was ex-
tended indefinitely. The impact of this provision was disruptive for both legal and
economic history. Arguably, it allowed the VOC is perform better on any measur-
able outcome than all its European competitors taken together, including the EIC.
One of the most resilient of the Roman law principles illustrated in the previous
section was the idea that a partner could exit at will by forcing the liquidation of
the partnership. Similarly, a tenant in common could exit at will by forcing the
liquidation of the co-owned asset. The flip side of these principles was that an
agreement to remain in a partnership or a joint ownership for the long term was not
enforceable in court. As the EIC charter broke with this principle, it set in motion a
series of additional changes.
Strong entity shielding is not practical without committed capital, and vice
versa. The reason is that creditors and equity holders could collude to liquidate
(possibly inefficiently) the company if either of them has a right to do so. There-
fore, the introduction of permanent capital also meant that entity shielding against
the investors’ personal creditors could be made stronger. In turn, tradable shares are
not necessary without committed capital. The EIC charter allowed trade in shares
but there was very little of it, since investors had committed their capital only for
the shortest possible duration, that of a return voyage. In contrast, trade in VOC
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shares picked up immediately after the chartering of the company, owning to the
longer maturity of the equity, the need to balance the inevitable loss of liquidity on
the part of individual equity holders, and a simplified procedure for their transfer,
which also improved notice of ownership.
Permanent capital gave the VOC a crucial advantage at the margin, allowing the
company to invest more heavily on infrastructure and a large fleet stationed in Asia,
which in turn made return trade voyages both faster and safer, and boosted company
profits. The growing company both could and needed to massively borrow to keep
up with its activities. In turn, the large debt exposure transformed the unlimited
personal liability of the director into a reason for concern and spurred action on
their part. After a series of failed attempts to have full limited liability written in
the new charter, the directors simply decided to write it into the company bonds in
1623, a solution with the courts later upheld (Punt, 2010; Gelderblom, de Jong, and
Jonker, 2013). Thought obtained contractually, limited liability was a byproduct of
the scale of the business operations made possible by permanent capital.
Throughout the 17th and 18th century, the corporate status remained a privilege
granted ad hoc by the state. In the 19th century, however, a series of general incor-
poration statutes both in the United States and in Europe made the format available
to any company satisfying certain predetermined conditions and procedures (Butler,
1985). According to Blair (2003), it was the lock-in of capital that made the cor-
porate form so popular in the 19th century in the United States, compared to other
organizational forms, such as the partnership, whose capital could be withdrawn
at will. Since it has locked-in capital, the corporation requires more severe checks
32
on directors than would be necessary in partnerships, which explains the different
fiduciary duties imposed on corporate directors (Stout, 2005).
The lock-in of capital is conspicuous by its absence from the menu of options
offered by traditional Islamic law. Kuran (2012) argues that the absence of ways
to lock-in capital in private corporations and reliance on an inadequate trust-like
institution held back the economic development of the Islamic world and set it on
an suboptimal path that has lasted for centuries. The corporations that emerged in
the North of Europe in the beginning of the 17th century were motivated by the
possibility to make enormous profits by trading with Asia directly. The Cape route
effectively bypassed the local monopolies on sections of the traditional silk road to
the East that had made Italian and Ottoman traders rich for centuries. In turn, the
need for capital lock-in in the North came from the fact that equipping a ship for
oceanic travel was about four times as expensive as doing the same for Mediter-
ranean or North-Sea trade. The scale of the investment made it impossible that
any individual, family or close kin could supply the necessary resources, and hence
pushed traders to collect large amounts of capital from strangers, who could not
be trusted with keeping their capital invested. This evolution required particularly
favorable political conditions, characterized by relatively weak governments with
a strong commitment to protect trade, such as they were in England after the Civil
War and the Glorious Revolution and in the Dutch Republic (North and Weingast,
1989; Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2017).
Indefinite maturity is a defining characteristic of equity. Extant accounts of this
feature in corporate finance leverage on the need for an infinite horizon to align
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the interests of managers and owners (Fluck, 1998; Myers, 2000). In contrast, the
analysis above suggests an alternative reason. The lock-in of capital emerges as an
expansion of the set of enforceable promises among partners12 and allows investors
to protect the company from inefficient individual withdrawals, which, for instance,
could be motivated by sudden liquidity needs.
Conceptualizing equity as committed capital yields novel insights about the re-
lationship between ownership and control. To expand: the lock-in of capital and
the separation between ownership and control are complementary features of the
corporation. As we have seen above, historically the emerged together. The lock-in
of capital facilitates the separation of ownership and control. Compared to a part-
nership (where individual withdrawals are allowed), incentives for equity holders to
acquire information about the company’s profitability in a corporation are diluted,
because of lower marginal benefits in the face of similar costs. Being unable to
withdraw assets, shareholders have weak incentives to control management. Con-
versely, the separation between ownership and control lowers the costs of locking
in capita. The fact that potential equity sellers in the stock market are less likely
informed reduces the degree of asymmetric information in the market and hence
improves its liquidity. In turn, greater liquidity makes the restriction on the right
to withdraw and liquidate less costly because investors with sudden liquidity needs
can easily divest and exit without losing much value. Ex ante, the prospect of easy
exit through the sale of shares makes investors more willing to commit their capital.
In this model, the advantages of having committed capital are felt especially
12For a theory of optimal enforcement of contracts see Goetz and Scott (1980).
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when there is a large number of shareholders, while the partnership remains more
viable for small groups. With uncommitted capital, an increase in the number of
investors generates centrifugal forces that, due to the risk of individual liquidity
shocks, make the organization particularly unstable. Most importantly, this analysis
suggests that the separation between ownership and control is a feature, not a bug, of
the corporate form. Namely, it reduces the private cost (in terms of loss of liquidity)
of committing capital for the long term and makes it possible for large numbers of
investors to form a business organization.
1.5 Applications
In this section, I introduce two applications that show the relevance of entity status
at two topical moments in the life of a firm: when the firm borrows funds and when
it trades essential assets. In both cases, the main focus will be on showing that
the legal entity and the firm are two radically different notions and that important
details are lost when only focusing on the firm without properly accounting for its
organizational structure under the law.
1.5.1 Credit and bankruptcy
The first application concerns the relationship of the firm with its creditors. In
a recent case discussed by Baird and Casey (2013), a firm is organized in mul-
tiple legal entities, say, a stadium and the adjacent parking lot. If the firm is in
financial distress it may incur bankruptcy and, with it, creditors may be subject to
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automatic stay, which limits their ability to attach the firm assets. The firm’s orga-
nizational structure is relevant because entities, not firms, are subject to bankruptcy
law. If the firm is organized in two separate entities and only one of them enters
into bankruptcy, the creditors of the other entity are not subject to automatic stay.
While it is not possible to contract around bankruptcy law—that is, the firm
cannot not waive a creditor’s automatic stay in bankruptcy by contract—organizing
the firm in several legal entities does allow some measure of flexibility in the
way bankruptcy law applies. The crucial difference between contracting around
bankruptcy and doing essentially the same though legal entities is that legal entities
are property structures and, hence, the legal organization of the firm can be easily
verified in public registries—more generally, is subject to notice—while contracts
would not. But why would a firm give some creditors—that is, those of the entity
at low risk of bankruptcy—such strong rights to start with?
Partitioning off assets in separate legal entities gives a creditor guaranteed on
those assets stronger rights than secure credit. In particular, if the entity may is kept
out of bankruptcy, the creditor will not be subject to automatic stay and hence will
retain a right to withdraw the asset if not repaid in full. This hostage value, increases
the likelihood that the firm will repay to start with and could on balance reduce the
firm’s cost of credit. Thus, allowing firms to tailor bankruptcy law through legal
entities could be beneficial.
Ayotte (2018) identifies a trade-off that the law should address. Automatic stay
induces debtors to borrow excessively from creditors who are informed about the
firm’s going concern value. These creditors are better positioned to assess the risks
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in bankruptcy but may inefficiently push for continuation, because they can exter-
nalize some of the risks on earlier creditors. Instead, having the possibility to work
around automatic stay through legal entities induces debtors to borrow excessively
from uninformed lenders, who are now willing to lend at lower rates because they
are protected by the withdrawal rights. This in turn results in inefficient liquidations
ex post due to the exercise of those rights. Finally, if debtors are allowed to partition
off assets into separate legal entities, they may do so inefficiently often because of
inefficiencies caused by sequential contracting with different sets of creditors.
Therefore, the flexibility allowed by entities should be regarded with caution.
What is important for our purposes is that analogous analysis cannot be carried out
unless the important differences between a firm and its legal status are properly
accounted for, that is, without a theory of business organizations.
1.5.2 Contract assignability
Similarly, legal entities can also be used as a way to bundle contracts that are com-
plementary to each other. This approach complements the theory of the firm as
property over complementary assets by extending the analysis of complementarities
among contracts. Ayotte and Hansmann (2012, 2015) consider a firm whose only
assets are contracts; say, a bundle of complementary licenses to distribute certain
products. The question they address is whether the firm owner should be allowed
to assign—that is, to sell–these contracts to third parties.
A trade-off arises from the need, on the one hand, to permit the owner to sell
assets—contracts, in this case—to cover for liquidity shocks and, on the other hand,
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the risk that once the contracts are bundled together, the owner might assign strate-
gically only some of them to low-value third parties and externalize the costs of
doing so on the parties to the contracts that remain bundled.
Legal entities allow parties to resolve this problem. If the firm has legal entity
status, the party to the contract is the firm, not the firm owner. As a result, even
if contracts are not assignable, the owner can cover for liquidity shocks by selling
the firm. Sale, in fact, allows the owner to assign all contracts together as a bun-
dle while, due to the lack of assignability, she cannot assign individual contracts,
separating them from the bundle. In essence, legal entity status allows for an eas-
ily verifiable way—as above, through notice attached to the proprietary status of
legal entities—in which contracts can be made assignable conditional on the whole
bundle being assigned. As we have noticed above, the property rights supporting
legal entity status substitute for the (impractical) multilateral contract that would be
necessary to mimic this result.
1.6 Epilogue: business organizations as collections of individu-
als redux
Both the theory of the firm and the theory of business organizations illustrated in this
chapter are squarely centered on assets. Firms and organizations, however, critically
rely on the contribution of individual employees and managers. They bring human
capital into the firm, which is often as valuable, and sometimes more valuable than
the physical capital that the firm owns. Human capital is different from physical
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capital because individuals cannot be owned and hence human capital cannot be
easily committed for the long term (Hart and Moore, 1994).
Rajan and Zingales (1998) bring human capital to bear on the theories we are
considering. The essential recognition is that giving a party contributing human
capital to a business project property rights on essential assets might overshoot.
The reason is that, since that party can take the asset with her if she leaves the
firm, she might not have incentives to make firm-specific investments. In contrast,
if the assets are owned by a third party and she only has access to them, she will
be able to use the assets as long as she remains in the firm but will no longer be
able to use them if she leaves. When a party has no value for the assets outside
the firm, she will have optimal incentives to specialize investments to the firm’s
activities. By considering access to essential assets as an important component of
a firm’s organization, the authors stress the importance of individuals next to assets
in defining what a firm is, and allow for the possibility that allocating control rights
away from those making essential contributions might improve incentives.
Very loosely, this approach reconsiders some of the points made by Alchian and
Demsetz (1972) about team production, but it remains nevertheless firmly grounded
on the fact that ownership is a necessary component of organizations. Blair and
Stout (1999) extend this approach to examine the legal organization of firms and
the role and duties of corporate directors. In corporations, assets are owned by the
entity, not by any of the individuals making human capital investments (who only
have access to them), and for this reasons the corporation is managed by directors
whose independence is guaranteed by law, so that they do not only cater to the
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interest of the shareholders but of the corporation as a whole.
I conclude this chapter with a reflection on how the theory developed here re-
lates with extant literature on organizations and, in particular, with the large body
of scholarship on corporate governance. Corporate governance examines ways in
which providers of finance assure that they receive a return on their investment in
the face of agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and control
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The law offers a set of default contractual arrange-
ments that can be tailored to the specific needs of each organization. In this chapter,
I have showed that this “contract approach” to the study of corporations and other
business organizations is complementary to a second, possibly more fundamen-
tal, “property approach”. What I have called the theory of business organizations
stresses the role of organizational law in defining property rights—or, more gen-
erally, claims—on firm assets. Through this lens, the separation of ownership and
control is a feature, not simply a problem, of large business organizations.
Organizational law is a mixture of default rules, which set the reference points
around which contracts are negotiated, and mandatory rules, which define the bound-
aries of such contracts and create a number of fundamental proprietary rights that
allow business organizations to operate as fictitious “subjects” for the law. While
both perspectives are important to understand how organizational law shapes orga-
nizations, the property approach is essential to distinguish organizational law from
general contract law (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000b), and business organizations
from relational contracts (Goetz and Scott, 1981). Contracts do not own assets,
stand in court, go bankrupt and trade in the marketplace, organizations sometimes
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do.
The theory of business organizations explains when and how organizations are
regarded as “bodies” (corpora), that is, fictitious “persons” under the law and can
thereby act, in many ways, as human persons do. In turn, the personification of an
organization requires detaching the organization’s assets from the individuals who
provide, manage and hold claims on them; that is, it requires to depersonalize busi-
ness. Once this step is taken—we have seen two diametrically opposite ways in
which this outcome was reached in history—the organization’s assets can operate
autonomously from the individuals behind them. Consequently, a business organi-
zation is a pool of assets with its relations to several classes of individuals—owners,
creditors, managers, contractual counterparts, employees, and so forth—it is not a
group of individuals.
While the theory of business organizations focuses on what organizations are
and explains the relationship between the organization and the individuals with
whom the organization interacts, corporate governance focuses on the relationships
among those individuals. To expand, the perspective emphasized in corporate gov-
ernance is the agency relationship between management and shareholders. Man-
agers have a contract with the corporation which in turn is owned by the sharehold-
ers; they are not in a direct contractual relationship with the shareholders. However,
through the lens of agency theory the latter is a relatively unimportant detail. What
counts is that management can be seen as an agent of the shareholders. Yet, think-
ing of an organization as a nexus of contracts sheds too little light on the fact that
relationships between individuals and the organization—that is, the organization’s
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assets—are characterized and regulated by rights in rem—that is, property rights.
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2 Capital Lock-in, Liquidity, and the Separation of
Ownership and Control
Abstract
Who should own firm assets, the collection of investors or a distinct legal
entity? In a partnership, individual investors own firm assets and retain the
right to unilaterally withdraw their capital at will. If, instead, firm assets are
owned by a distinct legal entity (the corporation), investors implicitly waive
this right, locking capital in the firm. Capital lock-in facilitates long-term in-
vestments but carries a risk of inefficient continuation of unprofitable projects.
Withdrawal at will can lead to the inefficient liquidation of profitable projects.
In this chapter I provide a theory of the capital lock-in and the choice of orga-
nizational form.
Keywords: liquidity, ownership and control, theory of the firm, legal entity,
capital lock-in.
JEL codes: G30, K22.
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2.1 Introduction
For more than a generation, corporate finance and legal scholarship have been dom-
inated by two big ideas, whose influence can hardly be overstated: the notion that
the corporation can be viewed as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Easterbrook and Fischel, 1989) and that it is affected by a potentially very prob-
lematic separation between ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932). This
chapter revisits both premises and proposes a novel perspective on business organi-
zations.
The nexus of contract approach, while providing invaluable insights in the the-
ory of corporate enterprises, suffers from a limitation. Thinking of corporations
as contracts reduces organizational law to a menu of default contractual options
among which the parties can choose. Even though none of its proponents probably
took the theory to this extreme, the nexus of contract metaphor carries the risk of
inducing a merely contractual perspective on business organizations. Recent schol-
arship (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2002) has stressed the role of organizational law
in regulating claims on firm assets. This is no small task. Without organizational
law, firm assets would be owned (possibly, jointly) by the firm owners, they would
be sizable by their personal creditors and give raise to liabilities that would be guar-
anteed by the owners’ personal assets. Moreover, the owners, rather than the firm,
would acquire property, enter into contracts and stand in court to bring or defend
against lawsuits. Organizing businesses of the scale we know today would be im-
possible, but this was the western world before the invention of organizational law
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(Abatino, Dari-Mattiacci, and Perotti, 2011). It took centuries to develop the set of
rules that allow us to say that firms have their own assets, clearly separated from
the personal assets of the owners, and can enter into contracts, own property and
stand in court in their own name through (human) agents. Those rules do not estab-
lish default contractual rights; they create mandatory proprietary rights (Hansmann,
Kraakman, and Squire, 2006; Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2017).
This chapter presents the first formal inquiry into a property-rights theory of
business organizations. The analysis starts from a fundamental question: should
firm assets be owned jointly by the firm owners (an arrangement that we will refer to
as partnership) or should they be owned by a separate legal entity (the corporation)
which is in turn owned by the firm owners? This is the most fundamental way in
which the law regulates claims on firm assets. In the partnership, owners retain the
right to withdraw their part of firm assets. A withdrawal right allows each owner
the power to force the liquidation of the firm: if assets are heavily complementary,
the firm might not survive individual withdrawals.13 In contrast, in a corporation
owners do not have a claim on assets and cannot withdraw their part. Assets belong
to the corporation and capital is therefore locked in. There is only one way to exit:
the sale of one’s shares to another investor. A sale changes the identity of one of
the shareholders but has no effect on firm capital.
13Section 801(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) recites that a partnership at will (that is,
not for a specified period of time or purpose) is dissolved and its business must be wound up upon
notice of a partner’s express will to withdraw. The remaining partners might unanimously decide to
roll over their capital, form a new partnership and continue the business but asset complementarities
and holdout problemsmight make this option unavailable or very costly. In the model, I will assume
perfect complementarity and focus on automatic dissolution upon withdrawal by one of the partners.
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Locked-in capital is an essential prerequisite to realize a full separation of per-
sonal versus business assets and liabilities, and to effectively regulate creditors’
claims on these different pools of assets, which in turn is a necessary condition for
share tradability and long-term investment (Blair, 2003; Stout, 2005; Hansmann,
Kraakman, and Squire, 2006; Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2006). Historically, lock-
in was central to the development of the modern corporate form in the 17th century.
The Dutch East India Company was the first trading corporation endowed with
permanent capital, decades before its competitors. The lock-in of capital was a
crucial determinant of the company’s success and, in particular, it fostered long-
term investment. Lock-in went hand in hand with a marked separation between
ownership and control and a booming secondary market for shares (Dari-Mattiacci
et al., 2017). Conversely, the lack of legal rules supporting business organizations
with locked-in capital has been shown to have caused economic underdevelopment
(Kuran, 2012).
While locking in capital has clear advantages, it also creates a liquidity prob-
lem for investors: absent the exit option given by the right of withdrawal at will,
investors need an alternative way to exit. Tradability of shares provides a solution
to this problem only if there is a liquid market for shares. A mere formal statement
that shares can be traded without the unanimous consent of the other investors is
not enough. In turn, liquidity is hindered by the fact that sellers might be asymmet-
rically informed about firm profitability. Therefore, liquidity is restored by tradable
shares only if sellers can credibly commit not to (excessively) monitor managers.14
14In this setting liquidity is enhanced when some information is removed from the market in the
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Given even moderate costs of monitoring, such commitment can be provided by
an otherwise pernicious common-pool problem in monitoring that emerges when
the number of investors grows large. The direct implication of this mechanism is
that the separation of ownership and control, far from being necessarily pathologi-
cal (as in Berle and Means, 1932), is in fact an essential feature of corporations as
it allows for a liquid market for shares, which is in turn necessary to balance the
disadvantages of lock-in.
In the equilibrium that will emerge in the model presented here, partnerships
form among few investors; partners monitor the manager because free-riding in
monitoring is not too serious when only few monitors are involved. In turn, the
liquidation option prevents the manager from inefficiently continuing all projects
with poor prospects while forcing the liquidation of some profitable ones due to
the unilateral withdrawal of partners in need of cash. In contrast, a corporation
forms among many investors who, due to free-riding, do not monitor the manager
intensely. As a result of the lack of unilateral withdrawal rights, the manager contin-
ues all projects, including inefficient ones, but will never have to liquidate profitable
ones. The loss of liquidity due to lock-in is balanced by a secondary market whose
liquidity is enhanced by low monitoring levels and large numbers of outstanding
shares.
Two additional implications will emerge from the analysis. First, partnerships
are plagued by inefficient liquidation of profitable projects due to the partners’ id-
iosyncratic liquidity needs; by contrast, corporations are affected by inefficient con-
spirit of Pagano and Volpin (2012) and Holmstrom (2015).
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tinuation of unprofitable projects due to the lack of shareholder oversight. Second,
the traditional managerial agency-problem is solved in different ways. In partner-
ships incentives are provided by monitoring: the manager is monitored and hence
induced to select good over bad projects. In corporations incentives are provided
by the allocation of residual control rights to the manager: monitoring might be low
but the manager is sure to be able to continue all projects, which restores incentives.
This chapter is organized as follows. The remaining of this introduction con-
nects the present analysis with the extant literature. Section 2.2 presents the model.
Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 solve the model for the corporation and the partnership, re-
spectively. Section 2.4 compares these two different organizational forms in terms
of monitoring levels, loanable funds and share value at issuance, and character-
izes the manager’s choice of organizational form, delivering the main message of
the chapter. Section 2.6 concludes with a set of empirical implications and further
extensions. Technical proofs are in the Appendix.
2.1.1 Property rights in firms and business organizations
The theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) stresses
the importance of property rights as characterized by residual control rights on as-
sets, which solve problems arising from incomplete contracts. At a very funda-
mental level, this notion of property is orthogonal to the notion of property in legal
scholarship. In the latter, the problem that property solves is not one of incomplete
contracts; it is one of incompatible contracts. Since contracts are usually bilateral
affairs, a contract between A and B might create claims that are in contrast with
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the claims generated by a another contract between A and C. For instance, A might
pledge the same security to both B and C. The problem arises because A, B and
C cannot typically sit at the contracting table together, so that property rules are
required to decide which of the contracts prevails (Merrill and Smith, 2000; Hans-
mann and Kraakman, 2002; Ayotte and Bolton, 2011). While in the theory of the
firm property is required because a fully complete contract is unachievable at rea-
sonable costs, in the theory of business organizations property is necessary because
a grand multilateral contract is impractical.
These two lines of research have remained largely disconnected. The theory
of the firm stops short of providing a theory of how the firm should be legally
organized and the theory of business organizations lacks a formal implementation.15
I operationalize the notion of property in a way that is compatible with both the
theory of the firm and the theory of business organizations. The lock-in of capital is
the fundamental property arrangement that makes it possible for organizational law
to regulate claims on firm assets by all investors (equity and debt holders) and to
legally partition these assets away from the personal assets of the owners. These are
proprietary arrangements in that they prevail over possibly incompatible contractual
15There are, however, two notable exceptions. Ayotte and Hansmann (2015) present a formal
model of legal entities where the entity status allows the bundled assignability of contracts that have
more value together than if taken in isolation, thereby mitigating the risk of opportunistic transfers
that the assignment of individual contracts would create. Ayotte (2018) studies formally the effect of
legal entity status on the possibility to withdraw assets during bankruptcy. These two papers stress
that legal entity status waves contract or bankruptcy rules that would otherwise apply and that the
waiver might be beneficial thanks to the fact that the legal entity status, being a proprietary matter,
involves a degree of notice that mitigates the negative effects to third parties. The present study is
very close in spirit to them but addresses a different problem: the lock-in of capital that comes with
legal entity status.
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claims that parties may held (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2002). (Limited liability
is but one example of the importance of such a partitioning.)
Yet, the right to withdraw one’s capital at will can be viewed as a—possibly, the
most fundamental—control right on firm assets—and capital lock-in as the lack
thereof—so that my approach can be seen as expanding the theory of the firm
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) in a yet-untapped direction.
The theory of the firm asks whether a single manager or a single investor should
own firm assets. I introduce a collection of identical investors and ask the follow-
ing question: how should we regulate the exercise of the residual control rights
held by this collection of owners? The partnership gives individual residual-control
rights to each of them while the corporation does not and runs into collective action
problems.
2.1.2 The legal origins of the corporate form
The question of who owns firm assets is the question to be answered to distinguish a
corporation, which has “legal entity status” or “corporate personhood”, from other
types of firms, which do not. The historical evolution of business forms from the
middle ages onward suggests that the corporation emerged out of the need to lock
in capital for the long term when new trade opportunities required unprecedented
amounts of investment for a much longer time span than previously done (see Dari-
Mattiacci et al., 2017, for an extensive discussion and references). These new trade
opportunities came from the onset of Atlantic trade in the late sixteenth century. In
particular, trade with Asia allowed north-European merchants to bypass the middle-
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men that had dominated the silk route for centuries and to trade directly in spices,
textiles and other valuable commodities. Up to that time, trade was organized in
single-purpose partnerships that formed among few investors and dissolved at the
return of the ships. Reinvestment was not rare but it was crucially dependent on
unanimous consent. This model worked well for trade within Europe and with
North Africa but the scale of investment needed to finance the larger and more ex-
pensive fleets traveling to Asia exposed the limitations of short-term equity: it was
impossible to make long-term investments in trading posts and forts and to station
fleets in Asia if each partnership had to be dissolved upon returning. Rolling over
the capital to the next partnership was impractical and fraught with hold-out prob-
lems.
Both England and the Dutch Republic played a crucial role in this period, but the
organizational structure of their respective East India companies—EIC and VOC,
respectively—differed markedly along a few dimensions. First of all, the Dutch
VOC had medium-term capital by 1602 and permanent capital by 1612, while the
EIC struggled to introduce it until 1657 due to its different political environment.
Permanent capital allowed the Dutch to outspend the English in long-term Asian
assets, which in turn made trade more expedient and allowed the company to lever-
age on economies of scale more efficiently. The gap in the performance of the two
companies during this period is remarkable. Yet, that was not the only effect of
lock-in.
The VOC had a famously liquid market for shares, with no match in England.
Yet, the difference was not due to the fact that trading shares in the EIC was not
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allowed. In fact, it was. Liquidity derived from the fact that, due to lock-in, many
small non-monitoring investors joined in the financing effort and trade occurred
among the equally ill-informed investors of a centrally managed corporation. Con-
trol and ownership were less clearly separated in the EIC, where shareholders had
more substantial voice and official meetings were regularly called. Moreover, trade
would concern not the EIC as such but one of the partnerships that operated a single
or a handful of voyages under the EIC flag, which in turn were smaller in size, dif-
ferent from each other and often of idiosyncratic value. This situation magnified the
asymmetric-information problem and made trade a rare occurrence compared to the
VOC. The model that I will present in the following will examine the relationship
between lock-in, liquidity and the separation between ownership and control in a
formal way and produce results that are in line with these stylized facts.
2.1.3 Relation to the literature
Next to the connection to the theory of the firm and the theory of business orga-
nizations, this chapter is related to the literature that, starting with Adam Smith
(1776) and most commonly associated with Berle and Means (1932), inquires into
the costs and benefits of the separation between decision-making power and risk-
bearing in business organizations. Such a separation is problematic but has been
recognized to generate three sets of benefits related to the superiority of hierarchi-
cal decision-making over market allocation, scale economies in decision-making
and risk-diversification (Coase, 1937; Chandler, 1977; Williamson, 1979; Fama and
Jensen, 1983). I add a novel advantage to this list.
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The trade-off presented in the present analysis reverses the common interpre-
tation of the free-riding problem among dispersed shareholders as causing agency
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and instead gives it a positive twist: free-
riding among shareholders is necessary in order to reduce the incentives to moni-
tor—which are provided by the speculative side of monitoring—thereby reducing
adverse selection and enhancing the liquidity of the secondary market for shares.
If liquidity is not provided by the market, liquidity needs can create detrimental
liquidations; however, differently from Diamond and Dybvig (1983), liquidation is
efficient if forced by monitors. The latter aspect points to a detrimental effect of liq-
uidity in partnerships: it induces investors to rely on exit rather than voice (Coffee,
1991; Bhide, 1993), which creates external effects.
Monitoring takes two forms in the model: active monitoring reduces the man-
ager’s private benefits from choosing a bad project, while speculative monitoring
enhances the informativeness of prices in the secondary market, as in Aghion,
Bolton, and Tirole (2004). In their model, active monitoring occurs inside the
firm while speculative monitoring is the domain of external investors. I consider
internal investors who can monitor both actively and speculatively. In the vein
of Edmans (2009), incentives to monitor are due to its speculative aspect, that is,
to the possibility to sell upon learning that the project is unprofitable, the “Wall
Street Rule” of voting with one’s feet. In his model, managerial discipline follows
from the effect that trade by blockholders has on price. Instead, in my model the
(dispersed) speculative monitors will at the same time actively monitor and hence
constrain management. Monitoring, however, is not the only way to incentivize
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managers. In a corporation with low monitoring levels, managers are incentivized
by the prospect of (inefficient, from the shareholders’ point of view) continuation.
That is, leaving some “initiative” to managers works as a substitute of direct con-
trol by shareholders. As in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), while control by
shareholders might be ex post efficient, it reduces managerial gains and hence the
manager’s incentives.
Differently from Diamond (2004), the prospect of liquidation reduces the man-
ager’s incentives to choose the good project because it deprives her from the bene-
fits of control and hence makes long-term investment inferior to short-term private
gains, so that denying the investors the option to liquidate can improve incentives.
More broadly, the choice between the corporate and the partnership form that this
chapter analyzes can be framed in terms of the optimal allocation of control over
continuation decisions when contracts are incomplete (Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
Closely related, Fluck (1998) and (Myers, 2000) focus on the indefinite maturity
of corporate equity as necessary in order to align the incentives of managers and
owners and contrast it with definite-term agreements in partnerships.16 Instead, in
the present chapter, duration is indefinite both in corporations and in partnerships
since investors can withdraw at will if they act collectively. What changes between
the two organizational forms in my model are the withdrawal rights of individual
investors.
16There is also a related literature on efficient partnership dissolution (Cramton, Gibbons, and




Themodel characterizes a trade-off between inefficient liquidation of valuable projects
due to individual liquidity shocks and inefficient continuation of unprofitable ones
due to lack of shareholder oversight. In the model, managers do two things: they
choose between good and bad projects and they decide whether to continue a project
or liquidate it after a signal has been realized. The typical agency problem emerges
because managers derive private benefits from running bad projects and from con-
tinuing unprofitable ones. Monitoring by investors can cure both problems. Moni-
toring is “active” in the sense that it reduces the private benefits from bad projects
and hence induces the manager to opt for good ones. At the same time, monitoring
is “speculative” in that it allows monitors to learn the firm profitability and hence
intervene in the manager’s continuation decision.
Partnerships and corporations balance this trade-off in different ways. What is
crucial is that in a partnership each individual partner can force the liquidation of
the company and hence block inefficient continuation decisions, while in a corpo-
ration this is not possible. Clearly, even if individuals do not have the power to
liquidate the corporation, a qualified majority of them has. For simplicity, however,
and without loss of generality I assume that coordination costs due to the need to
exchange information and vote are prohibitively high. This assumption allows us to
contrast the corporation, where inefficient continuation is the rule, with the partner-
ship, where this problem can be avoided. Relaxing this assumption would mitigate
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the inefficient-continuation problem in the corporation but it would not eliminate it,
as long as coordination costs are present. This would simply make the results less
sharp without providing additional insights.
A second crucial assumption that I make for simplicity is that assets are per-
fectly complementary. Think of a machine that has no value if taken apart. This
exacerbates the inefficient-liquidation problem that affects partnerships because it
turns each individual withdrawal into the automatic liquidation of the firm. In re-
ality, firms might continue to operate, possibly at lower efficiency, even if part of
the assets were liquidated. I exclude this possibility and focus on the sharpest sce-
nario of perfect complementarity. Relaxing this assumption would mitigate the
inefficient-liquidation problem but it would not eliminate it, as long as assets are
sufficiently complementary so that liquidation follows from withdrawal by a suffi-
ciently large fraction of the partners. As above, the results would not be qualita-
tively affected.
The trade-off between inefficient continuation and inefficient liquidation plays
out as follows. In a partnership, investors can withdraw their capital at will and
hence prevent the inefficient continuation of the firm. To do so, however, they need
to monitor the manager and thereby learn whether the project is successful. On the
downside, monitoring puts them in an informational advantage vis à vis external
investors, who refrain from trading with them or do so at depressed prices. The
external market for partnership shares shrinks, thereby making exit through liqui-
dation the only valuable option for both liquidity-strapped partners (who trigger
possibly inefficient liquidations) and monitors who have discovered the poor firm
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prospects (and hence trigger liquidation efficiently). Hence, partnerships might in-
efficiently dissolve: if an investor experiences a liquidity shock and needs to cash
out, the only option may be to liquidate the firm.
The balance between efficient and inefficient liquidations is affected by the
number of investors. With only few investors the aggregate liquidity risk—that is,
the probability that at least one investor suffers a liquidity shock and hence triggers
liquidation—is low and monitoring is high, thereby putting at thumb on the scale on
the side of efficient liquidations. The chance that at least one investor experiences
a liquidity shock increases rapidly in the number of investors, hence making the in-
efficient liquidation problem more severe. At the same time, monitoring decreases
due to a common-pool problem among investors—liquidation by a monitor creates
positive externalities for other investors—further unbalancing the result. Partner-
ships perform well with few investors but become very unstable as the number of
investors grows, which negatively affect firm value.
In contrast, in a corporation, shareholders cannot withdraw their shares. There
will never be inefficient liquidation because the only exit option for a shareholder
with liquidity needs is the sale of shares. Since liquidation is not an option, in-
creasing the number of shareholders does not carry a liquidation risk and corpora-
tions remain stable even with a large shareholder base. Individual monitoring levels
decrease with the number of shareholders as in the partnership but for a slightly
different reason. Here there is no externality due to efficient liquidations, but the
price one can obtain when selling the shares of an unprofitable firm decreases with
the number of investors. The reason is that the price becomes more information-
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efficient as the number of shareholders increases. Hence buyers can more easily tell
profitable and unprofitable firms apart and price them differently. In turn, the gain
from monitoring is reduced because of the reduced expected price of shares if the
project is bad. This mechanism plays a role in partnerships too, but here it is the
only channel through which monitoring levels decrease. Thereby, monitoring levels
are higher in a corporation than in a partnership if the number of investors is large
and vice versa if the number of investors is small. Corporations perform better than
partnerships when there are many investors.
The model endogenously generates the separation between ownership and con-
trol as a consequence of the lock-in of capital. Quite counter-intuitively, given an
optimal choice of organizational form, the few partners in a partnership have a right
to withdraw their capital and find it advantageous to monitor the manager intensely;
in contrast, the many shareholders in a corporation have their capital locked in the
corporation and nevertheless find it advantageous not to monitor the manager (or to
do so relatively less intensely). This apparently puzzling result squares well with
the empirical reality where the separation of ownership and control is a feature of
large corporations rather than of small partnerships and where voice is the dominant
form of control in a partnership while corporations rely on exit. In fact, exit can re-
place voice only if there are potential buyers out there. The disperse ownership that
is typical of a corporation would be dysfunctional in a partnership because it would
bring about too high liquidation rates. In contrast, in a corporation it functions as
a commitment not to monitor and hence allows for the development of an external
market for shares that operates under conditions of “sufficiently symmetric” infor-
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mation.
2.2.2 Setup and timing
In the model there are three sets of players—an entrepreneur/manager, primary-
market investors (which I will simply call “investors”) and secondary-market in-
vestors (which I will call “outsiders”)—who act over five dates: date 0 (investment),
date 1 (monitoring), date 2 (trade), date 3 (continuation versus liquidation), and date
4 (project payoff). I compare two alternative organizational forms, the partnership
and the corporation, chosen at date 0. The only difference between the two is that
in a partnership investors have the right to withdraw their capital unilaterally at date
3, while in a corporation they do not have such a right and hence continuation is
the only option, that is, capital is locked in the corporation. All else is the same,
including the possibility to exit by selling one’s shares.17 The timing of the game is
summarized in Table 1 and illustrated below. The table also highlights the variables
that are private information of one or more parties, while all unmarked variables are
common knowledge.
At date 0, an entrepreneur/manager owns assets A and a productive idea that
needs an investment equal to I to yield a return qRI if the project is successful,
where R > 1 is the return per unit of investment and q is a stochastic variable that
takes value 1 with probability p and 0 with probability 1− p. I take I and A to be
integers. If I shares of unitary nominal value are issued, the manager can retain
17Commonly, trade may be restricted in partnerships. The model can be easily extended to part-
nership with non-tradable shares and all results are preserved.
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at most A shares and sell I− A shares to investors. If the manager successfully
raises enough capital, she chooses between a bad and a good project, p ∈ {pL, pH},
respectively. Note that p is the probability that the project is successful, that is, that
q= 1. The bad project yields q= 1 with probability pL = 0—that is, it yields zero
for sure—and hence it is optimal for investors not to invest if they anticipate that
this project will be chosen. The good project yields q= 1 with probability pH > 0,
or pHR> 0 per share in expectation.
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), project pL (the bad project) yields a
positive private benefit b if the manager is monitored by at least one investor (mon-
itoring efforts are perfect substitutes), and B > b if the manager is not monitored.
In contrast, project pH (the good project) yields no private benefit. Monitoring by
investors at date 1 reduces the manager’s private benefit from the bad project and
makes the good project relatively more appealing to her.
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Actions Private information
(everything else is common knowledge)
Date 0 (Investment)
A
The manager chooses project p ∈ {pL, pH} Only the manager observes the choice of project
and the organizational form
B
The manager invests A,
n investors invest 1 each
Date 1 (Monitoring)
A
Nature draws the monitoring costs ci ∼ U(0,1) Only the investor observes his monitoring cost
Each investor i may monitor Only the manager observes monitoring choices
B
The project pL yields a benefit b or B> b
to the manager depending on monitoring
Date 2 (Trade)
A
Nature draws the liquidity shocks li ∼ B(1,λ ) Only the investor observes his li
and the firm’s profitability q∼ B(1, p) Only monitoring investors observe q
B
Investors may offer their shares for sale
Sales are effected at the market price
Date 3 (Liquidation versus continuation)
A
Remaining investors may liquidate,
if the organizational form allows
B
The payoffs from liquidation (L)
is realized or the project is continued
Date 4 (Project payoff)























While in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) investment follows monitoring—and
hence there is no commitment problem associated with monitoring—in the present
model the choice of the project occurs a date earlier than monitoring, the manager’s
choice of the project will depend on the equilibrium level of monitoring that she
expects to be chosen by investors at date 1, which in turn depends on a stochastic
monitoring cost. For the same reason, the investor’s decision to invest at date 0, will
also depend on their expectations about the date-1 monitoring, which in turn deter-
mines whether the manager will choose the good project. Therefore, a high-enough
equilibrium level of monitoring at date 1 will be a necessary condition for project
financing at date 0 in the equilibrium. The assumption that the entrepreneur chooses
the project before monitoring decisions are made is realistic in many settings and is
a key driver of the model.
Bad project Bad project Good project
(unmonitored) (monitored)
Probability of success pL pL pH
Manager’s private benefit B b 0
Table 2: Projects
Assuming that the project pH is financed at date 0, at date 2 two things hap-
pen. First, investors are exposed to a liquidity shock with probability λ , that is, to
the possibility that they need cash at date 3 and hence cannot wait until the date-4
payoff is realized. Those who experience the shock need to exit immediately by
trading their shares or liquidating the company. Second, monitors learn the project
profitability q. If q= 0, it is imperative to exit immediately through trade or liqui-
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dation. As a result, if the project is profitable (q= 1) only liquidity sellers will offer
their shares for sale on the market and will trade with outsiders in a condition of
symmetric (lack of) information about firm profitability. If instead the project is not
profitable (q = 0), both liquidity sellers and strategic seller (the monitors) will be
on the market and outsiders will face a positive share of asymmetrically informed
traders.
Outside buyers will try to infer whether the project is profitable or not, and hence
determine the maximum price they are willing to pay, depending on the volume of
sales. Yet, they can do so only imperfectly because both the number of liquidity
sellers and the number of strategic sellers are stochastic variables, depending on
the occurrence of the liquidity shock and the magnitude of the monitoring costs,
respectively. The market will reflect this information by pricing shares at higher
levels if the offer is limited and at lower levels if the offer is large. As a result the
price might be higher or lower than the expected value of the shares. In expectation,
the market price will be lower than the expected value of the shares pR because of
adverse selection by the strategic sellers. The difference between the two shrinks
when the market is better able to discriminate between profitable and unprofitable
projects.
All sellers have the same reservation price of 0, because late payoffs are worth
nothing to liquidity-stripped investors and, similarly, a project known to be unprof-
itable is worth nothing to strategic sellers. Yet, if liquidation is an option, as it will
be the case in a partnership, sellers will only be willing to sell if the market price
is above the early-liquidation value L per share, while they will always sell if the
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liquidation option is not available, that is, in a corporation. I capture this aspect
of the problem by allowing sellers to place limit orders on the market. Intuitively,
the limit will be L for partnership shares and 0 for corporate shares.18 Only in a
partnership, if the price is too low (which in turn happens when too many sellers
are on the market) trade will fail to provide a valuable exit option and liquidation
will be triggered at date 3. Firms that are not liquidated yield a return qR—that is,
either R or 0—per share at date 4.
2.2.3 Players
Manager (choice of project) The manager is concerned about two things: the
returns she earns from her A shares and the fact that the project might be liquidated
prematurely at date 3, in which case the project yields AL for sure but the manager
bears a positive loss-of-control cost. For simplicity and without loss of generality
I capture this aspect of the problem by assuming that the liquidation value of the
firm is zero for the manager.19 Therefore, for the manager the bad project has a
value only equal to private benefit. In contrast, the good project has a value that
depends on the probability that the project is continued, which I denote with Γ and
will be a function of the investors’ decisions going forward. In case of continua-
tion, the project yields ApΓR to the manager, where pΓ = pH if the project is always
continued—that is, if Γ = 1—and pΓ > pH if the project is discontinued with a pos-
18Recall that, for simplicity, I assume that early liquidation never occurs in a corporation. See the
discussion of this assumption in Section 2.2.1
19Given a positive loss-of-control cost k, our assumption is that k = AL. While somewhat restric-
tive, this assumption greatly simplifies the analysis. Doing away with it would make the results less
sharp since liquidation would be lesser of a punishment for managers choosing bad projects.
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itive probability, which, as we will see, includes the discontinuation of unprofitable
projects and hence enhances the expected value of the continued projects above
their unconditional probability of success. 20 The manager will choose the good
project if
AΓpΓR≥Mb+(1−M)B (1)
whereM is the probability that at least one investor monitors the manager and hence
the private benefit of the bad project will be b. Conversely, with probability 1−M
no investor monitors the manager and the private benefit deriving from the good
project is B. Note that the manager chooses the good project more often—that is,
for lower levels of monitoring—if the probability of continuation is large enough.





showing that, at the equilibrium, either the probability of monitoring at date 1 or
the continuation probability at date 3 (or both) have to be sufficiently large for the
manager to have incentives to choose the good project at date 0. Thus, leaving con-
trol on the continuation decision to the manager can substitute for low monitoring
levels by investors.21
20I assume here that the manager cannot sell her shares if the project turns out to be unprofitable.
Insider trading law may prevent the manager from doing so.
21We will see that in a corporation Γ = 0, while in a partnership Γ > 0 is a function of monitoring.
as discussed in the text. Note also that, if (1−Γ)ApHR < b the inequality cannot be satisfied
because the right-hand side is greater than 1 whileM ≤ 1 (hence the manager inevitably chooses the
bad project); instead, if (1−Γ)ApHR ≥ B the inequality is always satisfied because the right-hand
side is less than 0 whileM ≥ 0 (hence the manager always chooses the good project).
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Investors (monitoring and liquidity shocks) Investors own an amount 1 of cap-
ital each; thus, n≡ I−A investors are needed to finance the project at date 0. Upon
investment, at date 1 each investor i can monitor the manager at a cost ci, which
is independently drawn from the uniform distribution U [0,1]. Monitoring has two
consequences:
1. At date 1, the benefit from choosing the bad project pL is reduced from B to
b if at least one investor monitors (monitoring is “active”);
2. At date 2, those who chose to monitor at date 1 privately learn the realization
of q (monitoring is “speculative”).
In the present model, investors take simultaneously the role of active and specula-
tive monitors. Contrast this setup with Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004), where
these two roles are taken by two different actors. Active monitoring exhibits the
traditional common-pool problem, because effective monitoring by one investors
directly benefits other investors, in a very stark way: active monitoring produces no
private benefits because it simply acts as a punishment on managers who choose pL
at date 0. Absent the speculative aspect of monitoring, there would be no monitor-
ing in equilibrium. Therefore, in the model, the possibility to gain from the private
information that monitoring gives acts as a motivation to monitor. Differently from
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), where monitoring has a preventive effect, here moni-
toring has a deterrent effect only if it is incentive compatible, because it takes place
after the manager has chosen the project.
Monitoring is unobservable to others and hence other investors and, crucially,
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outsiders will not know if a particular investor is a monitor. This is an important
determinant of the adverse selection problem in the secondary market. In equilib-
rium, an investor will monitor if his monitoring cost is below a certain threshold µ ,
which will depend, as we will see, on the private benefits accruing from asymmetric
information. Given the uniform distribution of ci, µ will also represent the proba-
bility that an investor of unknown type is a monitor. Therefore, the probability that
at least one of n investors is a monitor in equilibrium has the following form:
M ≡ 1− (1−µ)n
which increases in n and in µ .22 It is this equilibrium probability that determines
the entrepreneur’s choice of project at date 0, accounted for above.
At date 2, next to learning by monitors, an individual liquidity shock occurs
with probability λ and determines the liquidity-type of each investor.23 An investor
i of type li derives utility
Ui (Y3,Y4) = liY3+(1− li)Y4
from his proximate level of consumption Y3 (at date 3) and his future level of con-
22This formulation possibly gives too much weight to the effectiveness of monitoring by one,
however small, individual investor in a big organization and may result in aggregate monitoring
levels M going up in n even as the individual monitoring level µ goes down with n. However, this
feature does not affect the results (see especially Proposition 4) while using a different function form
would greatly complicate the analysis.
23More precisely, an investor i has a two-dimensional type (ci, li), where the two dimensions are
independently drawn: the liquidity-type of an investor is independent of his cost-type.
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sumption Y4 (at date 4). There is a safe and inexpensive storage technology, so
that present returns can be transferred to the future but not vice versa: the projects
returns are not pledgeable and hence an investor cannot borrow against them to fi-
nance his current consumption. Therefore, the probability λ determines whether
an investor wants to consume now (li = 1, with probability λ ) or later (li = 0, with
probability 1−λ ) as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).24 The probability that at least
one of the n investors experiences a liquidity shock at date 2 is:
Λ ≡ 1− (1−λ )n
Outsiders (trade) Outsiders own (enough) capital and are there only to buy shares
in the company if any of the inside investors sells. The problem they face is that
both monitoring and liquidity shocks are unobservable and hence they will trade
under asymmetric information. In particular, an outside buyer will not be able to
discern whether she is buying from a liquidity seller—who has experienced a liquid-
ity shock and hence is selling shares in a project of expected value equal to pR—or
a strategic seller—who is trying to divest from a project that she has discovered
through monitoring to be unsuccessful and hence worth 0 for sure.
24To make the effect of liquidity shocks as sharp as possible, I am effectively assuming that they
make investors value future consumption at zero. This assumption could be relaxed to allow for
a positive future consumption value at the cost of making the analysis more cumbersome. Equiv-
alently, we could interpret λ as the probability that the investor discovers an alternative and more
profitable business opportunity and hence would like to divest and switch to it.
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2.2.4 Trade in the secondary market
At date 2 a competitive market-maker observes the flow of share offers and an-
nounces the price. Since there is an infinite supply of buyers, the price is set at the
buyers’ reservation price. The amount of shares offered for sale reveals information
about the profitability of the project (as in Kyle, 1985). Since liquidity sellers are
always on the market, a larger offer flow suggests that also strategic sellers might be
on the market and hence that the project might be unsuccessful. Both the number of
liquidity sellers and that of strategic sellers are stochastic, and hence the offer flow
does not perfectly reveal the quality of the project. Sellers observe the price and
decide whether to sell or not; that is, they put limit offers that are effected only if
the price is above a predetermined threshold. Buyers always buy at their reservation
price.
Note that, since there is noise, the price will typically be higher than zero (the
value of a share in the company if the project is unsuccessful) and lower than R
(the value of a share in the company if the project is successful). In expectation,
liquidity sellers will bear a trading cost—a wedge between price and value—due to
the asymmetry of information. The trading costs will be shown to decrease in the
number of outstanding shares.
All sellers offer shares for sale simultaneously. The market-maker sees that a
number ν of the n outstanding shares are offered for sale and uses this information
to update her belief about the probability that the project is profitable, the prior
being p. Given a—known, for now—individual monitoring probability equal to µ ,
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we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. After observing the offer flow ν , the posterior probability of success is
Pr [q= 1 | ν] =
pλ ν
pλ ν +(1− p)(λ +(1−λ )µ)ν (1−µ)n−ν
which increases in λ , p, and n, decreases in ν and becomes more information
sensitive (that is, steeper in ν) as µ increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
The posterior probability of success accounts for the fact that strategic sellers
refrain from selling shares in good projects. The numerator is the probability that
the ν sellers are liquidity sellers, that is the probability that the project is good (p)
times the probability that exactly ν investors have experienced a liquidity shock
(λ ν ). The denominator is the total probability of having ν sellers, that is, the proba-
bility that the project is good and only liquidity sellers sell plus the probability that
the project is bad (1− p) and both liquidity and strategic sellers sells conditional on
the latter having monitored the manager (and all others n−ν not monitoring).
Intuitively, if the prior probability of success p increases, this will reflect posi-
tively on the posterior. Likewise, if the probability of a liquidity shock λ increases,
the chance that a seller is a liquidity seller goes up and so does the posterior, because
many sales are a weaker signal that the project is bad. If instead the probability of
monitoring goes up the effect is different. Having a high probability of monitoring
makes it easier for buyers to discriminate between situations where the project is
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likely to be successful (when there are few sellers on the market) and situations
where the project is likely to be unprofitable (when there are many sellers on the
market). Thus, a higher probability of monitoring makes both the presence (bad
news) and the absence (good news) of strategic sellers more easy to disentangle
from the background noise, which is due to the presence of liquidity sellers. There-
fore, an increase in µ makes the flow of offers more informative and hence the
posterior more sensitive to it: the posterior probability of success will hence more
steeply decrease in ν. Finally, more sellers on the market relative to the volume
of outstanding shares (higher ν or lower n) makes the posterior go down because
seeing more sellers might indicate that also strategic sellers are on the market.
Figure 1 shows the density of ν for two different values of µ . As µ grows, the
density becomes bimodal, which makes it easier to tell cases of strategic sale apart
from liquidity sales.
Figure 1: Density of the number of sellers (p= .5, λ = .3 and n= 30)
Similarly, Figure 2 shows how the posterior changes with ν for different values
of µ . With a high µ , the posterior becomes steeper in ν , with a clear tendency to
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take one of two values (0 or 1) in most of the cases.
Figure 2: Posterior probability of success (p= .5, λ = .3 and n= 30)
The market-maker sets a price that matches the expected value of the project
given the information publicly available. The price reflects the posterior probability
of success of the project and is equal to the ratio of good projects over all projects
on the market times the expected value of a project.
Lemma 2. The market-maker sets a price equal to
P(ν) =
λ
λ +(1−λ )µ Pr [q= 0 | ν]
Pr [q= 1 | ν]R
which increases in R, n, λ and p, decreases in ν and becomes more information
sensitive (that is, steeper in ν) as µ increases. In addition, there is a cutoff level
of µ such that P(ν) decreases in µ below the cutoff and increases in µ above the
cutoff (the cutoff is equal to zero for some parameter values).
Proof. See Appendix.
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Figure 3: Price of shares (p= .5, λ = .3, R= 10 and n= 30)
The fraction λ
λ+(1−λ )µ Pr[q=0|ν] is the probability that an individual seller is a
liquidity seller and hence that the project has average value Pr [q= 1 | ν]R per share.
This probability accounts for adverse selection in the denominator: with probability
λ an investor has a liquidity shock and enters the market; with probability (1−λ )µ
an investor is a monitor who does not have a liquidity need. However, due to adverse
selection, monitors will enter the market only if the project is unprofitable, that
is with the posterior probability Pr [q= 0 | ν]. The price is characterized by the
same intuitive comparative statics as the posterior probability of success and, in
particular, decreases in the number of shares offered for sale, ν , and becomes more
informative as the monitoring probability µ increases.
We are interested also in the date-2 price that can be expected at date 1, when
the offer flow is not know yet. Liquidity sellers expect to trade at an average price
contemplating both the possibility that the project is profitable and the opposite
possibility that it is not.25 In contrast, strategic sellers will only trade unprofitable
25Recall that liquidity sellers attach a value zero to later returns, including from good projects.
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projects. In turn, if a project is unprofitable, all strategic sellers sell and the price,
due to the high volume of trade ν , will be relatively low. Hence the strategic sellers’
expected price at date 1 has to be made conditional on q= 0 (if q= 1 strategic sellers
are not on the market). The following lemma fully characterizes the expected prices.
Lemma 3. The expected price is





which increases in R, n, λ and p, and initially decreases while later increases in µ .
The expected price conditional on q= 0 is




P(ν)Pr [ν | q= 0]
which increases in R, λ and p, and decreases in n and µ .
The expected price conditional on q= 1 is




P(ν)Pr [ν | q= 1]
which increases in R, λ , p, n and µ .
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence their reservation price is 0 or, if they have the power to liquidate, L.
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Figure 4: Expected price as a function of monitoring (p = .5, λ = .3, R= 10, and
n= 30)
While most of the comparative statics is intuitive, the effects of n and µ call
for some comments. As we have observed, an increase in µ makes the price more
information sensitive in the sense that it becomes easier for buyers to distinguish
between profitable and unprofitable projects by looking at the number of shares for
sale. This makes the expected price of unprofitable projects decrease in µ . Simulta-
neously, the price of good projects, that is, the price conditional on q= 1, increases
in µ . Either of these two effects might dominate. The reason is that an increase in µ
brings about more precise information but also a more serious problem of adverse
selection. Therefore, which of these two effects dominates depends on the level of
µ . When µ is small, the negative effects of adverse selection dominate the positive
effect of increased information efficiency and the expected (unconditional) price
decreases in µ . At higher levels of µ the positive effect dominates and the price
increases in µ .
A change in the number of outstanding shares has similar but not identical ef-
fects. An increase in n makes inference from the number of shares for sale more
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precise and hence increases the wedge between the price of profitable and the price
of unprofitable projects as µ does. Yet, an increase in n carries no negative conse-
quences and hence this positive effect causes the loss due to adverse selection to go
down monotonically and the price to increase correspondingly as n grows large. In
the limit, the market prices profitable and unprofitable projects correctly, neutraliz-
ing the workings of adverse selection, and the expected price is equal to the ex ante
value of projects, pR. Figure 5 illustrates these results: the more the conditional
prices of good and bad project (top and bottom curves) diverge, the smaller the cost
of trade becomes—that is, the closer the (unconditional) expected price gets to the
expected return of the project.
Figure 5: Expected price (p= .5, λ = .3, µ = .25, and R= 10)
2.2.5 Continuation or liquidation decision
The project has a positive liquidation value per share equal to L < 1, so that if
the project is to be liquidated for sure, it is not worth investing in it. The first-
best continuation decision at date 3 consists of liquidating the project if q = 0 and
continuing if q= 1. I the additional assumption that pHR> 1, so that the expected
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returns of the good project are greater than the initial investment, irrespective of
the continuation decision. Therefore, it is optimal to invest in the good project even
when the liquidation option is not available. Given this assumption, we have pR> L
and hence it is not profitable to liquidate the project if the value of q is unknown.
These assumptions eliminate essentially uninteresting cases from the analysis.
Given this setup, an inside investor has two possible reasons to either force the
liquidation of the firm or try to sell his shares on the secondary market: he might
have monitored the firm and learned that the project is unsuccessful (q = 0) or he
might have experienced a liquidity shock.
At date 3 the manager always prefers to continue rather than to liquidate, be-
cause, as emphasized above, her liquidation value net of the loss of control is zero.
Absent a decision by the investors, the project will continue. In a partnership, each
partner holds the right to veto continuation as he can unilaterally force the liquida-
tion of the company. In a corporation, instead, continuation is the norm.
2.2.6 Organizational choice
Our goal is to determine whether the business should be organized as a partnership
or as a corporation at date 0. There are three problems that the choice of the business
form has to balance, each occurring at a different date in the future:
1. Providing the entrepreneur with incentives to choose project pH at date 0,
which in turn requires providing investors with sufficient incentives to moni-
tor at date 1;
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2. Providing liquidity through the secondary market at date 2;
3. Assuring the optimal continuation decision at date 3.
How these three problems are balanced will determine both the financial viabil-
ity—that is, the possibility for the manager to rise enough funds—and the ex ante
value of the firm. Conditional on the project being financed, we will look for the
organization form that maximizes ex ante value of the firm.
2.3 Equilibrium monitoring
Let us start by assuming that for a given organizational form the manager has cho-
sen the good project and investors have provided the necessary capital at date 0.
We can then determine the equilibrium level of monitoring chosen by investors at
date 1. Since the monitoring choice depends on whether exit is restricted to trade or
is also allowed through liquidation, monitoring will be different depending on the
organizational form. In each organization form, we will look for the Nash equilib-
rium of the game played by the inside investors—who choose the monitoring level
as a best response to the price arising in the secondary market—and the outside
buyers—whose reservation price is the best response to the monitoring level.
2.3.1 Corporations
In a corporation, continuation at date 3 is assured by the fact that investors can-
not force the liquidation of the company. Consequently, both liquidity sellers and
strategic sellers are willing to sell for any positive price at date 2; the former because
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they value late payoffs at 0 and the latter because they know the project will yield
a payoff equal to 0. (Thus, limit orders will be entered by sellers with a limit equal
to 0.) Since exit by trade is the only way to gain from monitoring, each investor
decides whether to monitor at date 1 based on his expectation about the buyers’
reservation price at date 3. In turn, each buyer decides his reservation price based
on his expectation about the (unobserved) investors’ monitoring choices at date 2.
The share price P(ν) that emerges in the secondary market is calculated in
Lemma 2 as the market-maker’s best response to the monitoring level µ . In turn, in
the equilibrium, we must also have that the investors’ monitoring choice is the best
response to the buyers’ reservation price P(ν), which in turn determines the price
at which exit will take place.
Each investor i monitors if the expected payoff from monitoring is weakly
greater than the expected payoff from not monitoring:
(1−λ )(pR+(1− p)Eν≥1 [P(ν) | q= 0])+λEν≥1 [P(ν)]−ci≥ (1−λ ) pR+λEν≥1 [P(ν)]
(Note that the expectations about the price are conditioned on at least investor i
being on the market and hence are not the same as P and P0 defined above, which
also allow for ν = 0.) The value of going forward without selling, (1−λ ) pR, is
unaffected by monitoring and appears on both sides of the inequality. Likewise for
λEν≥1 [P(ν)], investors who experience a liquidity shock sell irrespective of the
profitability of the project and hence monitoring is irrelevant in that state. Instead,
information about profitability has value when one can turn a zero-value investment
79
into a positive-value sale in a fraction (1−λ )(1− p) of the cases, that is, when the
investor does not need liquidity and the project is unprofitable.26 Figure 6 depicts
the state tree for an investor with unknown monitoring cost, who will draw ci ≤ µ
(and hence monitor with probability µ) or ci > µ (and hence not monitor with
probability 1−µ).
Figure 6: Liquidity shocks, monitoring and exit in corporations
More concisely, an investor monitors if
ci ≤ (1− p)(1−λ )Eν≥1 [P(ν) | q= 0]≡Cκ (µ) (3)
Given a probability of monitoring µ = Pr [ci ≤ µ], µ is also the level of ci that
26Note that the timing of trade makes it impossible for sellers to learn the profitability of projects
from the market price. Note however that this is not a strong assumption. The uninformed sellers’
reservation price is the same as the buyers’ reservation price, as the two groups of traders are equally
informed. In turn, the buyers’ reservation price is, by construction, equal to the expected value of
the shares given the information publicly available on the market. Therefore, uninformed sellers are
indifferent between holding on to their shares and selling them. This implies that an uninformed
investor cannot profit from information held by monitors.
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makes the investor indifferent between monitoring and not monitoring and hence
makes (3) hold as an equality. Since the right-hand side of (3) is a decreasing
function of µ , we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. The equilibrium level of monitoring in a corporation solves
µ =Cκ (µ)
The solution, µκ , is unique; µκ initially increases and then decreases in n.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that, quite intuitively, the individual monitoring probability decreases in
the number of investors n when n is sufficiently large owing to the fact that a larger
n makes it easier for buyers to discriminate between profitable and unprofitable
projects and hence reduces the price of bad projects and erodes the benefits of mon-
itoring. Note an important implication. In a liquid market for shares the large vol-
ume of trade assures that the market price is very close to the value of shares—and
hence the cost of trade due to asymmetric information is minimal. The gain from
monitoring derives from the fact that the monitor can dump shares of value 0 on
the market and obtain a positive price from uninformed buyers who cannot dis-
tinguish between strategic and liquidity sales. As the market prices shares more
accurately—which occurs when n is large—the gains from monitoring go down.
The dilution of the incentives to monitor is not due to free-riding among monitors.
In fact, the gains from monitoring are perfectly internalized by the monitor. The
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dilution comes instead from the information efficiency of the market. By remov-
ing liquidation as an exit option, the corporate form “forces” investors to trade on
the market thereby increasing trade volume, making the market more efficient and
reducing the incentives to monitor.
2.3.2 Partnerships
In a partnership investors retain the right to withdraw their capital, thereby forcing
the liquidation of the company unilaterally. Liquidation gives investors L per share
and hence it will occur only if the price P(ν) is below L.27 (That is, sellers will
enter limit orders with limit equal to L.) A breakdown of trade due to depressed
prices has positive and negative effects. On the negative side, it makes an individual
investor’s liquidity shock damaging for the company as a whole since some of the
projects that will be liquidated are profitable; these are inefficient liquidations. On
the positive side, a breakdown of trade reduces the risk of inefficient continuation
that plagues corporations; these are efficient liquidations.
On the one hand, compared to the corporation, where monitoring investors can
only exit by selling, in a partnership the value of monitoring is enhanced by the
fact that exit yields either the market price or the liquidation value, whichever is
higher. On the other hand, however, liquidation allows investors who do not moni-
tor to benefit from information gathered by monitors, who force the liquidation of
27Recall that L is the price obtained by selling assets on the market and is (by assumption) in-
dependent of the profitability of the project. Think of a case in which the machinery that the en-
trepreneur purchased for this specific project is resold and, prior to being put to an alternative use,
needs to be reconfigured.
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bad projects, which creates a free-riding problem in monitoring and dampens the
incentives to monitor as compared to the corporation. Which of these two effects
prevails depends, among other things, on the number of investors, which affects the
occurrence of inefficient liquidation, the extent of the free-riding problem and the
equilibrium price in the secondary market.
Let
ν ≡max{ν | P(ν)≥ L}
be the maximum volume of offers such that the share price is weakly greater than
the liquidation value. Since the price increases in n, also the cutoff ν increases
in n. Given that the price of shares P(ν) decreases in the volume of sales ν , we
have P(ν) ≥ L if ν ≤ ν and P(ν) < L if ν > ν . A high ν makes liquidation less
likely. Liquidation occurs if any investor experiences a liquidity shock and the
price is below the liquidation value or if, given that no investor has experienced a
liquidity shock and the project is unprofitable, any investor monitors and the price,
conditional on q= 0, is below the liquidation value. A high ν has a beneficial effect,
because it reduces the risk of inefficient liquidations, but it also has a detrimental
effect, because it prevents efficient liquidations. (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Liquidity shocks, monitoring and exit in partnerships




(1− p)(1−Λ)(1−µ)n−1L if ν ≤ 1
(1− p)(1−λ )E1≤ν≤ν [P(ν) | q= 0] if ν > 1

≡Cpi (µ)
If the price is below the liquidation value for any positive level of the flow of
offers, that is, if ν ≤ 1, then liquidation is always a better option than trade. In
this case, monitoring yields a private benefit only if the present investor is the only
monitor—that is, if no other investor monitors, with probability (1−µ)n−1—and
if no investor experiences a liquidity shock, including the present investor—that
occurs with probability 1−Λ.
If instead for some positive level of offers the price is higher than the liquidation
value, that is, if ν > 1, then the investor trades if ν ≤ ν and liquidates otherwise.
However, liquidation is the best option only if ν > ν > 1, that is, when there are
other investors who would want to liquidate the company anyway. In this case,
the present investor is not pivotal in the decision to liquidate and hence there is no
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private benefit from monitoring.
Note that when monitoring leads to the liquidation of the company there is a
free-riding problem among investors as action by any monitor generates a positive
externality consisting of the liquidation of an unprofitable project, which benefits
all other investors. (Note also that if L approaches zero, the monitoring probability
would be the same as in a corporation because ν would approach n.)28
Lemma 5. The equilibrium level of monitoring in a partnership, µpi , solves:
µpi =max{µ : µ ≤Cpi (µ)∀µ ≤ µ}
Proof. See Appendix.
2.3.3 Comparison
In a corporation, due to the lock-in of capital, exit by investors is only possible
through the sale of shares. In contrast, investors in a partnership can either sell or
unilaterally force the liquidation of the company. The possibility of liquidation cre-
ates two countervailing effects. On the one hand, investors in a partnership liquidate
only when the liquidation value is above the price, which improves monitoring in-
centives because it grants exiting investors the maximum between the two—this is
the first line in the expression forCpi (µ). On the other hand, since liquidation could
28Note that in a partnership with non-tradable shares, the monitoring decision reduces to ci ≤
(1− p)(1−Λ)(1− µ)n−1L. Since the right-hand side decreases monotonically in µ and in n, the
solution to µ = (1− p)(1−Λ)(1− µ)n−1L is unique and decreases in n. Moreover, the comparison
between the partnership and the corporation introduced in the next section holds (qualitatively) also
in this case, with a much simpler proof which can be inferred easily from the proof of Proposition 1.
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be efficiently triggered by another monitor or by a liquidity-strapped investor, the
possibility of liquidation generates a common-pool problem in monitoring, which
dampens the incentives to monitor—this is the second line in the expression for
Cpi (µ). Which of these two effects prevails depends, among other factors, on the
number n of investors.
Proposition 1. There is a firm size nˆ≥ 0 such that the equilibrium monitoring level
is larger in a partnership for small n and in a corporation for large n; that is,
µκ < µpi if n< nˆ and µκ > µpi if n> nˆ.
Proof. See Appendix.
As the number of investors grows large, the equilibrium monitoring level in a
corporation decreases because the price becomes more information sensitive, mak-
ing it less likely that a monitoring investor will be able to sell shares in an unprof-
itable project for a high price in the secondary market. This effect dampens the
incentives to monitor. In a partnership, there is an additional effect contributing
to lowering monitoring levels: a free-riding among monitors which arises because
an efficient liquidation benefits all investors. As a result, for large n, equilibrium
monitoring levels in a partnership will be lower than in a corporation.
2.4 Organizational choice
Having solved the model for the equilibrium monitoring level chosen by the in-
vestors at date 1 and the optimal price response in the secondary market at date 2,
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we can now investigate the determinant of organizational choice at date 0. We will
consider the problem from three different perspectives: maximizing the value of
the firm, in terms of returns on investment; the investor’s preferred choice, which
also takes into account the investors’ idiosyncratic liquidity needs and monitoring
costs; and, finally, the manager’s perspective. We will assume throughout that the
manager’s own invested funds A are enough to guarantee that the manager choose
project pH . We will return to this problem momentarily.
2.4.1 Value of the firm at date 4: Inefficient continuation versus inefficient
liquidation
As a first order effect, the lock-in of capital alters the way in which an organization
balances the fundamental trade-off between the inefficient liquidation of profitable
projects and the inefficient continuation of unprofitable ones. In a corporation (with
locked-in capital) projects are never liquidated because control of the continuation
decision at date 3 is handed over to the manager, who has a stake in the continu-
ation of all projects.29 In a partnership, however, investors retain control over the
continuation decision as there is no lock-in of capital, which, in turn, exposes the
company to the risk of liquidations triggered not only by the discovery that the
project is unprofitable but also by individual liquidity shocks. The latter are ineffi-
cient liquidations.
29Recall that we are assuming away the possibility for investors to coordinate and collectively
decide to shut down the project. This is without loss of generality. See the discussion above in
Section 2.2.1.
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First-best W ≡ pR+(1− p)L
Corporation Wκ ≡ pR
Partnership Wpi ≡ ΓpΓR+(1−Γ)L
Table 3: Expected returns of projects
In the first best, profitable projects should be allowed to continue and yield R
while unprofitable ones should be discontinued and yield L—rather than 0, which
they would yield if allowed to continue. In a corporation, all projects are continued.
The profitable projects yield R while the unprofitable ones, which are inefficiently
continued, yield 0. In contrast, in a partnership there is a positive probability that the
project will be discontinued, possibly inefficiently. With probability Γ the project is
continued; yet, continued projects no longer yield success in p cases because they
are positively filtered by monitoring investors. Conditionally on continuation, the
probability of success pΓ must be bigger than p.
Simple application of Bayes’ rule suggests, however, that the net effect must be
negative:
ΓpΓ = Pr [continuation]Pr [success | continuation]
= Pr [success∩ continuation]
< Pr [success] = p
The intuition is that, although the continued projects are conditionally more
likely to succeed, liquidations affect both profitable and unprofitable projects cre-
ating a loss, because profitable projects that are liquidated early yield L rather than
R. The term ΓpΓR< pR captures the inefficient-liquidation problems that plagues
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organizations without committed capital. There is, nevertheless, an upside. Dis-
continued projects yield L and unprofitable projects may be among those liquidated
earlier in a partnership. Both effects are captured by the term (1−Γ)L, which
must be different from (1− p)L because not all unprofitable projects are liqui-
dated—suggesting that the the former term could be less than the latter—and some
profitable ones are—suggesting the opposite. The liquidation probability is equal
to:
1−Γ≡ ΛPr [P(ν)< L]+(1−Λ)(1− p)MPr [P(ν)< L | q= 0]
The first addendum captures the risk of inefficient liquidations that are trig-
gered by individual liquidity shocks. Since liquidity-strapped investors need to exit
irrespective of the profitability of the project, they might trigger (inefficiently) the
liquidation of profitable projects. The second addendum accounts for the efficient
liquidations, which are triggered by monitors upon learning that the project is un-
profitable.
It is easy to see that either organization could yield the largest returns to invest-
ment. If L is close to zero, we have thatWκ = pR>ΓpΓR=Wpi because, as we have
observed, ΓpΓ < p. On the other hand, if L is close to pR, then the partnership yields
Wpi = ΓpΓR+(1−Γ) pR > pR =Wκ because pΓ > p. The choice of organization
form will crucially depend on how the organization balances the trade-off between
locking in capital—exacerbating the inefficient continuation problem—and failing
to do so—opening the door to inefficient liquidations.
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2.4.2 Value of investment at date 0: Liquidity and the separation between
ownership and control
Investors invest if share value is higher than the cost of the investment, which we
normalized to 1. In a corporation the ex ante value of one share is given by
Vκ = (1−λ )(pR+(1− p)µκEν≥1 [P(ν) | q= 0])+λEν≥1 [P(ν)]−
µ2κ
2
= (1−λ ) pR+λEν≥1 [P(ν)]+
µ2κ
2
where the first term is the value of the investment if the investor does not experience
a liquidity shock, and hence sells only if his cost of monitoring at date 1 is below
µ (that is, with probability µ) and the project is unprofitable; the second term is
the value of the investment if the investor experiences a liquidity shock and the






that investors in a corporation suffer a loss of liquidity due to their inability to
liquidate at date 3; this loss is reduced if the secondary market is liquid. Hence
share value is higher in liquid markets, that is, when P(ν) is high; P(ν) is the price
that sellers obtain when selling shares of expected value equal to pR> P(ν), where
the difference between the two is the cost of trade due to asymmetric information.
Similarly, investors benefit from lower monitoring costs.
The second line in the expression above is obtained by substituting the equi-
librium level of monitoring Cκ (µκ) = µκ into the first line and can be read as de-
picting the payoff for non-monitoring investors who do not experience a liquidity
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shock, the payoff of non-monitoring investors who experience a liquidity shock and
the net benefits of monitoring.
As the number of investors increase, the net benefit of monitoring decreases
because the price becomes more information sensitive and hence the price of un-
profitable projects goes down (Lemma 3). At the same time, the price of average
projects goes up because of the same reason and hence the liquidity loss due to
the lock-in of capital is reduced. As n grows, Eν≥1 [P(ν)] approaches the expected
value of the project pR and µκ approaches 0; hence, the ex ante valueVκ approaches
the expected returns of the project pR.
As the number of investors increases, liquidity in the secondary market and
the separation between ownership and control emerge as complementary features
of corporations. If investors are many, the price in the secondary market is more
information sensitive and is close to the real value of the project. In turn, this
dampens the incentives to monitor (because bad projects are priced low), relaxing
the investors’ individual control on the manager’s actions and increasing the price of
average projects in the secondary market. With high expected prices, the liquidity
cost of locking in the capital is reduced to a minimum, boosting the ex ante value
of the investment.
In a partnership, there is the additional option to liquidate the firm but also a
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where the first line is as in a corporation because the price on the secondary market
is high enough for exit through sale to be feasible. The second line depicts both the
advantages and the disadvantages of a partnership, which accrue when the price is
low and the only exit option is liquidation.
On the one hand, the partnership brings along a risk of inefficient liquidation
of good projects in a fraction pΛ of the cases, which increases with the number of
investors, n. On the other hand, the partnership allows for the efficient liquidation
of bad projects.
Proposition 2. The ex ante value of the investment is larger in a partnership for
small n and in a corporation for large n.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.4.3 The manager’s choice of organizational form
To capture the manager’s interest in continuation, we have assumed that the man-
ager cannot sell her shares in an unprofitable project (due to insider trading regula-
tions) and does not benefit from liquidation (the loss-of-control cost is equal to the
liquidation value).
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Therefore, the manager’s expected payoff from the corporation and from the
partnership are, respectively:
Πκ = ApR (corporation)
Πpi = AΓpΓR (partnership)
Since we have shown that ΓpΓ < p, the value of the investment for the manager
is maximized when the corporation is chosen ex ante. The manager prefers the
corporate form because it benefits from more initiative, even if subjected to more
monitoring. The intuition is that monitoring only eliminates bad projects but this is
a condition for investors to invest. Further monitoring from the perspective of the
manager is only costly if it leads to a loss of control (liquidation) which does not
happen in a corporation.
Proposition 3. The manager has incentives to choose the corporate form ineffi-
ciently often.
Proof. See text.
2.5 Financing of projects
The expected returns from investment in project pH for the manager is ApHR in
a corporation (because there is always continuation and hence Γ = 1) and only
AΓpΓR < ApHR in a partnership because there is a positive chance of liquidation.
The entrepreneur chooses the project before monitoring takes place but anticipates
the equilibrium level of monitoring, which is motivated by speculative prospects.
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A ≥ Mpib+(1−Mpi )BΓpΓR ≡ Api (partnership)
(4)
We know that ΓpΓ < pH , thus Api < Aκ is possible only if Mpi > Mκ and so
large to overcome the firm effect. For large n, we have µκ > µpi , which implies
Mκ >Mpi which yields that the entrepreneur needs to invest more of his own funds
in a partnership than in a corporation. For large n, partnerships are characterized by
more inside equity and less external funding. For small n, we have µκ < µpi and Γ
small and hence the ranking could be reversed and the manager could invest less of
her own funds in a partnership (this is easy to verify with n= 1).
Proposition 4. For small n, partnerships may require less manager’s equity and
yield greater ex ante value for investors. For large n corporations require less
manager’s equity and yield greater ex ante value for investors.
Proof. See text.
Relating this finding with Berle and Means (1932), the separation between own-
ership and control emerges endogenously in the model. With large n, corporations
are the optimal organizational structure and are characterized by relatively low lev-
els of manager’s funds Aκ and of shareholder involvement, as measured in terms of
the individual monitoring level µ .
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2.6 Conclusion
The analysis presented here has emphasized the role of capital lock-in in drawing
a line between different organizational forms. The traditional view has it that cor-
porations are affected by a pathologic separation between ownership and control. I
have shown that this is far from obvious. By locking in capital, investors transfer the
power to decide on continuation to the manager. Management becomes entrenched
in the sense that it will liquidate too few projects. However, an entrenched man-
agement has stronger incentives to invest in good projects at the outset (because it
can count on continuation) and this reduces the need for shareholder oversight. A
large number of uninformed shareholders results in a particularly liquid secondary
market which in turn balances the loss of liquidity due to capital lock-in. Thus,
the separation between ownership and control has two advantages: it ensures a liq-
uid market ex post and reduces monitoring costs ex ante. The lock-in of capital in a
corporation, however, has a major disadvantage: it opens the door to inefficient con-
tinuation of unprofitable projects. Monitors exit by selling their shares and hence
information about lack of profitability is not timely transmitted to other investors.
The partnership, which does not lock in capital, carries a reduced risk of ineffi-
cient continuation but has its own idiosyncratic flaw: the possibility that profitable
projects be inefficiently liquidated. Understanding the conditions under which a
partnership is to be preferred to a corporation requires unpacking the determinants
of this trade-off. With only few investors, the aggregate liquidity risk is low: there
is a small probability that at least one of the investors is subject to a liquidity shock
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and hence triggers liquidation (possibly inefficiently). At the same time, incen-
tives to monitor are relatively strong because, due to the small number of investors,
free-riding among monitors is not too problematic. As the number of investors
increases, however, both problems become more serious. The aggregate risk of liq-
uidity shocks increases radically, making partnerships very vulnerable to inefficient
liquidations. At the same time, free-riding among monitors reduces the aggregate
monitoring level, weakening the partnership’s ability to police the continuation of
unprofitable projects.
The corporation is not vulnerable to liquidity shocks and, since liquidation is not
an option, is not subject to the free-riding in monitoring that affects the partnership.
Therefore, the trade-off between inefficient continuation and inefficient liquidation
favors the partnership for small numbers of investors and the corporation for large
ones.
The theory of the choice between the partnership and the corporation presented
in this chapter suggests a number of applications and possible extensions that I
illustrate here.
Liquidity in the stock market. The problem analyzed here is similar to the one
examined by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990): uninformed traders pay a trading
cost due to the presence of informed traders in the market. Their solution is
to split the cash flows into multiple securities, for instance, debt and equity,
which appeal to uninformed and informed investors, respectively. In contrast,
however, equity is usually very liquid. The analysis presented here explains
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that this is the case because in a large corporation most of the insiders are
uninformed and this in turn is due to the fact that the price reflects information
relatively accurately and hence incentives to become informed are diluted.
At the same time, the trading costs generated by asymmetric information are
reduced and liquidity (defined as in Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990) is enhanced.
Dispersion of ownership. The analysis points to a beneficial effect of dispersed
ownership: it enhances liquidity, which in turn makes dispersed ownership
by uninformed investors possible. We have seen that share value at issuance
increases in the number of investors. The analysis is limited by the assump-
tion that each investor invests a unit of capital. Relaxing this assumption
would allow the investors’ base to be expanded by requiring a smaller outlay
by each of them. It is plausible to conjecture that share value would increase
due to a further decrease in the monitoring level. This observation can shed
light on two common policies: bankers try to disperse ownership widely at
IPO and antitakeover protection—in the form of hinderance to the concentra-
tion of shares—is commonplace in companies that go public or are coming
out of bankruptcy.
Insider trading. The analysis also points out that monitoring can be too low for
the manager to have incentives to choose the good project. Monitoring is
supported by the speculative gains of trade under asymmetric information.
Insider trading regulations curb these incentives and there is an optimal toe-
hold that induces enough monitoring without creating excessive trading costs
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in the secondary market.
Takeovers. While I have remarked that antitakeover provisions can have a bene-
ficial effect on the dispersion of shares, they may also have negative effects.
Corporations are plagued by a problem of inefficient continuation: they live
inefficiently long due to the private benefits that entrenched management de-
rives from remaining in power. In the model, dispersed investors cannot co-
ordinate to overrule management in the continuation decision. The specter of
an hostile takeover could reduce this problem as it exposes management to
dismissal if the company is run inefficiently.
Imperfectly complementary assets. In the analysis, I have assumed that assets are
perfectly complementary so that if one investor, no matter how small his part,
withdraws his capital, the firm has to be liquidated. In reality, complementar-
ities are important but might not be so dramatic. Firms might be able to run,
albeit less efficiently, on a subset of the initial assets and produce more profits
than the liquidation value. If this is the case, one liquidity shock might not
be fatal, but many will be. There will be a threshold number of investors who
withdraw capital in a partnership above which the partnership will be liqui-
dated. Allowing for this possibility might induce two interesting effects in
the model. On the one hand, firms running on weakly complementary assets
will probably resist liquidity shocks more easily and hence the advantages
of the corporation will be weaker. Comparatively, we should observe that
the more heavily complementary assets are, the greater the advantages of the
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corporate form become. On the other hand, allowing individual withdrawals
of capital might create runs on partnership assets which curb the effect just
described. First-comers will be able to sell their share back to the company
while late-comers will only be able to share in the (lower) liquidation value.
Inside liquidity provision. The model excludes the possibility for inside liquidity.
Cash-rich insiders might be willing to buy the shares of liquidity-strapped
partners. In turn, this possibility reduces the aggregate costs of liquidity
shocks and makes partnerships more resilient. At the same time, however,
this possibility opens the door to potential problems of hold-out and adverse
selection. Inside buyers might be uninformed and hence ignore whether the
seller is a liquidity seller or a strategic one. In turn, this replicates the prob-
lems that we have seen emerging in the secondary market. Inside buyers,
however, could be monitors who know the value of the company. Monitors
will not be subject to asymmetric information but may fall victim of holdout
by sellers who try to extract a higher price from them than the liquidation
value.
Other differences between partnerships and corporations. In the analysis I have
focused on what I consider to be the most fundamental difference between
the partnership and the corporation: the possibility for individual investors
to withdraw the capital invested. There are, however, many other relevant
differences. Different tax and liability regimes apply to partnerships and cor-
porations, the law allows for a certain degree of tailoring, and there exist other
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organizational forms that might be seen as lying in between the partnership
and the corporation. I have done so not to introduce confounding factors in
the analysis. I do not deny the importance of these factors but leave their
analysis to future research.
Partnerships with non-tradable shares. In the analysis, I have assumed that part-
nership shares can be traded without restriction in a market that functions in
the same way as the market for corporate stocks, so that, as emphasized, we
could zero in on the effect of the lock-in of capital without introducing con-
founding factors. This is commonly not the case. However, the results of
the analysis apply unchanged to the case of partnerships with non-tradable
shares, with the benefit of much simpler math. Non-tradability of shares has
the effect of reducing monitoring levels even further in a partnership because
it eliminates a possibly valuable exit option through trade and only leave liq-
uidation as the only way out. Monitoring levels in a partnership with non-
tradable shares decrease in the number of investors more rapidly than in the
corporation because of the free-riding problem created by the liquidation op-
tion. However, with few partners, liquidationmight be a more valuable option
than trade (as it is also when shares are tradable) leading to higher monitoring
levels than in the corporation in this case.
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3 Liquidity and Control within Organizations
Abstract
The commitment of financial resources to a project is essential for long-
term investment but brings about both a loss of control and a loss of liquidity
for investors. Therefore, investors are ordinarily given an exit option. In this
chapter, I contrast three common ways to exit: tradability of one’s equity
position, liquidation rights and redemption rights. I show that they balance
liquidity and control very differently. Large safe projects are better associated
with tradability, because the risk of inefficient continuation is low and the
market provides enough liquidity. Small risky projects are better associated
with redemption rights, because they can sort inefficient liquidations from
inefficient continuations. Liquidation rights are desirable when redemption
rights fail because of high costs of capital or the risk of runs on the company’s
cash.
Keywords: liquidity, control, redemption, tradability, exit.
JEL codes: G30, K22.
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3.1 Introduction
To capture the benefits of long-term investment, investors may elect to commit their
capital to a project for an analogously long term. Commitment, however, comes at
a cost, as it deprives an individual investor of the option to pursue an alternative
opportunity along the way. Moreover, this liquidity cost is accompanied by a loss-
of-control cost, as the possibility to pull out is a very valuable safeguard against
managerial opportunism (Sahlman, 1990). The rules governing business organiza-
tions restore liquidity in a variety of ways, essentially disciplining an investor’s exit
from the organization. Different exit provisions, however, affect control in different
ways.30
At one extreme, individual investors can be allowed to exit by forcing the liqui-
dation of the company. Traditional legal principles dating back to the Roman law
allowed partners to dissolve a partnership at will. The same principle of exit at
will governed the joint ownership of assets (tenancy in common). Although time
commitments are enforceable under some conditions, liquidation rights have been
a typical feature of partnerships for centuries (Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire,
2006, 1393). Two salient examples of successful partnerships are the Bardi, Peruzzi
and Medici banks in 14th- and 15th-century Florence and the companies that made
the Industrial Revolution in 19th-century England (Hunt and Murray, 1999; Harris,
30It is important to note at the outset that the collection of investors (or a qualified majority of
them) can always act to discontinue a project (Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, 2006, 1338).
Nevertheless, coordination costs may preclude this option, making individual exit the only feasible
solution. To zero in on the problems of interest, I ignore coordinated exit and focus on individual
exit only. Moreover, exit through IPO or acquisition is a form collective exit that is not considered
here. Finally, the focus is on equity, not on debt.
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2000). Liquidation rights make investment for the long term dependent on the con-
tinual agreement of all the investors, which in turn is more easily manageable in
small-size, close-kin groups. While giving investors full control over the continua-
tion of the project—and hence guaranteeing that a project is efficiently liquidated if
an investor discovers that the project is unprofitable—liquidation rights run the risk
of inefficient liquidations of profitable projects triggered by investors with liquidity
needs.
At the other extreme, investors can be allowed to exit by trading their shares.
Tradability is possibly the most fundamental feature of public corporations. When
investors exit by trading their shares on the secondary market, their capital remains
invested in the company. The first modern corporation was the Dutch East India
Company (VOC), chartered in 1602 in Amsterdam. The VOC was both the first
private company with fully committed capital and the first one with a liquid sec-
ondary market for shares. These two features are complementary: if capital is fully
committed, tradability is necessary to restore liquidity. By contrast, the English East
India Company (EIC, chartered in 1600) had formally tradable shares, but trade was
initially rare and the secondary market illiquid, arguably because the EIC did not
have committed capital until 1657 (Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2017). Allowing exit only
through trade carries the risk of inefficient continuation of unprofitable projects.
Since investors with private knowledge of poor profitability can exit through trade,
their private information does not directly result in the liquidation of unprofitable
projects (Coffee, 1991; Bhide, 1993). Sales may depress share price, but price is
a noisy signal of profitability because also investors with liquidity needs and no
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private information are on the market.
To emphasize: in a stereotypical corporation capital is locked in for the long
term and exit is possible only through trade, while in a stereotypical partnership
capital is uncommited and exit is possible only by forcing the liquidation of the
company.31 In between these two extreme exit options, redemption rights allow
investors to force the company to repurchase their shares for a predetermined re-
demption price, which is generally equal to the purchase price plus accrued but
unpaid dividends. Redemption rights are commonly included in venture capital
(VC) financings (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003, 291) and considered an important
safeguard against “walking dead” companies, which barely stay alive without being
particularly profitable.32 Redemption rights, however, may be regarded as a catch,
as investors may want to redeem precisely when the company is unprofitable and
hence has no cash to pay for redemption.33
However, as I will show in the following, the exercise of redemption rights may
sort projects, leading to liquidation with high probability if the project is unprof-
itable—thus, over-performing tradability—and with low probability if the project
is profitable—thus over-performing liquidation rights. The intuition is simple. In-
vestors motivated by liquidity needs will redeem their shares independently of the
31A partnership with tradable shares is an uninteresting hybrid for our purposes, as our results
would remain largely unchanged if we considered this possibility.
32Redemption usually needs to be requested by a qualified percentage of holders. Yet, an investor
can opt out and refuse to redeem. In the model I will abstract from these complications and look
at redemption as an individual decision. The key mechanisms behind my results would remain the
same in a more complex model.
33Venture capital financings have many defining characteristics that are not examined here, see
for instance Black and Gilson (1998); Gilson and Schizer (2003); Smith (2005); Cumming (2005,
2008).
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profitability of the project. In contrast, investors motivated by private informa-
tion—that is, those who know the project’s profitability—will redeem only if the
project is unprofitable. As a result, the number of redeeming investors—which will
be a stochastic variable in the model presented below—will tend to be larger if the
project is unprofitable; hence, the company will be pushed into insolvency and con-
sequent liquidation relatively more often when liquidation is efficient because the
project is unprofitable.
A recent Delaware case illustrates both the virtues and the problems with re-
demption rights. In ODN Holding34 a VC and the company board allegedly col-
luded to cause the company to engage in growth-reducing, cash-generating transac-
tions, the only purpose of which was to make redemption by the VC possible to the
detriment of common stockholders.
If the company is doing so poorly that the VC wants to redeem its shares, it is
in the interest of all investors that the company be liquidated. The beneficial sorting
of projects under redemption rights, however, comes with two types of costs. The
first cost is due to the need for the company to hold (or generate) cash in order to
be able to satisfy a certain number of redemption requests. The second cost is due
to the possibility of runs on the company’s cash, which in turn is due to the fact that
the redemption price is generally larger than the liquidation value of the company
and hence informed redeemers may be able to create a negative externality for other
investors, as ODN Holding nicely illustrates. As we will see, a necessary condition
34The Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corporation, C.A. No. 12108-VCL, 2017WL
1437308 (Del Ch. Apr. 25, 2017). See Reder (2017).
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to avoid runs is that the company holds enough cash. These costs may weigh against
the use of redemption rights for more than a selected class of shareholders.
Although they are commonly combined, I will analyze tradability, liquidation
rights and redemption rights in isolation in order to characterize them as sharply as
possible. These different exit options impact control and liquidity in very different
ways. On the one hand, liquidation rights overshoot when exit is motivated by a
liquidity need because they imply the liquidation of the company irrespective of the
investor’s motive. In a sense, they give investors too much control (as in Burkart,
Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997). On the other hand, tradability is at the opposite end
of the spectrum, because it never leads to the liquidation of the company, giving
investors too little control on continuation (as in Bhide, 1993). Somewhat in be-
tween, redemption rights may lead to liquidation only if the number of redemption
requests exceeds a certain threshold (above which the company is insolvent), which
has a beneficial sorting effect.
Which exit modality is more efficient depends on factors such as the number of
investors, the incidence of liquidity shocks and the riskiness of the projects. Large
safe projects are better associated with tradability, because the risk of inefficient liq-
uidation is low and the market provides enough liquidity. Small risky projects are
better associated with redemption rights, because they can sort inefficient liquida-
tions from inefficient continuations. Liquidation rights are desirable when redemp-
tion rights fail because of high costs of capital or the risk of runs on the company’s
cash.
These results are broadly consistent with the empirical literature documenting
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the more frequent use of redemption rights and other control rights on the continu-
ation decision when the potential conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and
the shareholders is more severe (Cumming, 2008). Since this particular conflict of
interest arises when the project is unprofitable, risky projects are more likely to be
associated with stronger control rights. Accordingly, Winton and Yerramilli (2008)
find that risky projects are more likely to be financed through venture capital financ-
ing, which is characterized by more intense monitoring of the continuation decision,
rather than with bank financing, characterized by laxer monitoring.35
The theoretical analysis that is most closely related to the model presented be-
low is the one by Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004), which focuses on trade as an
exit option while I also consider liquidation and redemption. There is a large related
literature on private versus public ownership (see Röell, 1996, for an overview).
This literature, however, generally assumes fully committed capital, while here the
degree of commitment is an important factor in the analysis. Commitment can ef-
fectively be limited by staged-investment agreements. The literature focusing on
venture capital stage financing (Tian, 2011) examines the relationship between a
single venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. In contrast, the presence of several
investors is a crucial factor in my analysis.
While focused on business organizations, the approach developed here could
provide insights as to why and under what circumstances commercial parties may
35Note, however, as emphasized below, that the literature on venture capital focuses on redemp-
tion rights held by a single investor (the venture capital firm). In contrast, a crucial element of my
model is that fact that multiple investors may exercise their redemption rights independently of each
other.
107
deliberately enter into low-commitment relational contracts as opposed to more
detailed—and more easily enforceable—agreements (Goetz and Scott, 1981; Scott,
2003, 2006).
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Entrepreneur and production technology
We consider a project p, which yields a return qR per unit of capital invested, where
q = 1 with probability p and q = 0 with the complementary probability 1− p, so
that p is the probability that the project is profitable and npR is the expected return
from the investment of n units of capital. If the project is liquidated early, assets
can be sold at a reduced price equal to L < 1 per unit of capital initially invested;
hence, nL is the liquidation value of the company. I assume that to run the project,
an amount of investment n is needed. Think of a project requiring the purchase of
a single machine which costs n, is expected to generate npR if the project runs to
the end and can be resold at nL < n if the project is discontinued early. To assure
that investment is in principle optimal, let the expected profit be larger than the
investment, that is, pR> 1.
An entrepreneur is endowed with a project p but has no funds and hence needs
external capital. The entrepreneur may decide to discontinue the project at an early
stage if it turns out that the project is unprofitable—that is, if she discovers q= 0. To
stress the potential conflict of interests between the entrepreneur and the investors, I
assume that the entrepreneur derives private benefits from running the project until
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the end and hence will have no incentives to discontinue an unprofitable project
early, while investors would like to do so because, if liquidated early, the project
yields L per unit of capital even if unprofitable, while it yields 0 if continued to the
later date. Different exit modalities give investors different degrees of control over
the continuation decision, as I will illustrate momentarily.
3.2.2 Inside and outside investors
(Inside) investors invest, for simplicity, 1 unit of capital each and only care about fi-
nal returns or, if they experience a liquidity shock, about interim returns.36 Investors
can elect to monitor the entrepreneur at a (random) cost. Monitoring is speculative:
if an investor monitors, he learns the profitability q of the project. Investors are
also subject to a random liquidity shock which makes them value later returns at
zero. Therefore, there are two possible reasons for investors to exit: a liquidity rea-
son—that is, the realization of a liquidity shock—and a strategic reason—that is,
private knowledge that the project is unprofitable. Since both the liquidity shock
and the monitoring costs are privately known, outsiders cannot distinguish between
these two exit motives when they observe an exit decision.37
Inside investors operate on the primary market only. An infinite number of
outside investors operate on a competitive secondary market and will buy shares at
their expected value given the information publicly available on the market (if trade
36Endogenizing the amount of capital invested by each investors is an interesting extension of the
model but one that is unlikely to alter the main message of the analysis.
37The presence of some informed outside investors would not alter the results provided that there




The model focuses on three stylized ways in which investors can exit: trade, liq-
uidation and redemption. With trade, exit is allowed only by selling shares on the
secondary market. With liquidation, exit is allowed only by liquidating the project,
which occurs at the request of any individual investor. With redemption, exit is
allowed by making a redemption request to the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur
holds enough cash, all redemption requests will be honored and the project will
continue. If the entrepreneur does not hold enough cash, the company becomes in-
solvent and is liquidated prematurely. Those who posted a redemption request have
priority on the available cash plus the liquidation value of the company. All other
investors then share the residual liquidation value, if anything is left. Effectively,
a redemption request turns a stockholder into a creditor with priority over (other)
stockholders. Although extreme, this characterization captures the main problem
with redemption, that is, the fact that it may generate an advantage over other (non-
redeeming) stockholders. (Note that exit through liquidation corresponds to the
case of redemption when the entrepreneur holds no cash but a liquidation request
does not give priority over other investors.)
Although redemption ordinarily needs to be requested by a (majority of) a class
of investors, dissenting investors are usually allowed to opt out. To capture this
aspect of the problem, I model redemption as an individual decision. Since the
project does not produce any value in the interim period, I assume that redemption
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yields the restitution of the initial investment, which is equal to 1 (the redemption
price). Redemption is thus more valuable than liquidation but less valuable than the
expected value of the project. Absent a liquidity shock or private information, it is
therefore inefficient to redeem.
3.2.4 Timing and setup
An entrepreneur with no funds is endowed with a project p at date 0. To run the
project, the entrepreneur needs funds equal to n. Since investors invest 1 unit of
capital each, the entrepreneur needs to raise capital from n investors on the primary
market. The entrepreneur may also collect additional capital to hold as cash. We
denote retained cash as νˆ; thus, in total the entrepreneur raises n+ νˆ units of capital
from an many investors. Note that, given a redemption price equal to 1, νˆ is also the
number of redemption requests that the entrepreneur can satisfy without becoming
insolvent.
At date 1, each investor draws a random monitoring costs: this cost is equal to 0
with probability µ and is prohibitively high (C > R) with the complementary prob-
ability 1−µ . If the cost is 0, the investor monitors the entrepreneur. Monitoring is
speculative (as in Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole, 2004). By monitoring, the investor
learns the value of q at date 2 so that, if q = 0, the investor knows that the project
is unprofitable and may decide to exit. At date 2, the investor may also experience
a random liquidity shock with probability λ . If the investor experiences a liquidity
shock, the value of money in the future becomes 0 and the investor needs to cash
out now on the investment (an in Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
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Both investors who have experienced a liquidity shock and investors who have
monitored and discovered that the project is unprofitable value the final project
returns qR at 0; hence, they prefer to exit at date 2 rather than to wait until date 4.
(We allow also all other investors to exit; we will examine when they will elect to
do so momentarily.)
At date 3, depending on the exit modality, the date-2 exit decisions may have
different consequences for the organization. Exit through trade does not affect the
organization, the capital remains locked in and the project continues with proba-
bility 1. Exit through liquidation discontinues the project with probability 1 at the




(everything else is common knowledge)
Date 0 (Investment)
A
The entrepreneur is endowed with a project p
The entrepreneur chooses the exit modality
B
The entrepreneur chooses how much cash νˆ to retain
n+ νˆ investors invest 1 each
Date 1 (Monitoring)
A Nature draws the monitoring costs ci ∈ {0,C} Only investor i observes his ci
B Each investor i decide whether to monitor
Date 2 (Exit)
A
Nature draws the liquidity shocks li ∼ B(1,λ ) Only investor i observes his li
and the firm’s profitability q∼ B(1, p) Only monitoring investors observe q
B
Investors may opt for exit
(trade, liquidation or redemption)
Date 3 (Liquidation versus continuation)
A
The firm may be forced to liquidate
depending on the exit modality
B
The payoff from liquidation (L)
is realized or the project is continued
Date 4 (Project payoff)
























If at date 1 the entrepreneur has acquired enough cash to satisfy all outstand-
ing redemption requests, the project continues. This is the case if the number ν of
redemption requests is less than or equal to νˆ . If instead the redemption requests
exceed the available cash, the project is liquidated; this happens when ν > νˆ . Re-
demption requests are posted simultaneously by investors. Continued projects yield
qR at date 4. Table 4 summarizes this setup.
3.3 Exit
3.3.1 Demand for exit and its information value
An important factor in the analysis is the number of investors who genuinely prefer
exit at date 2. Those are investors who either experience a liquidity shock (a “liq-
uidity exit” with probability λ ) or those who, without liquidity shock, monitor and
discover that the project is unprofitable, that is, they learn q= 0 (a “strategic exit”
with probability (1−λ )(1− p)µ). We will examine momentarily the possibility
for runs on the company’s cash by investors who neither experienced a liquidity
shock nor monitored (those who monitored and discovered q = 1 clearly have no
incentive to exit). For now, we focus on genuine exit decisions.
Since both liquidity exits and strategic exits are random variables, the number of
investors who desire to exit is also a random variable, which we denote by ν . There
are two states of the world. If the project is profitable (q= 1), then ν has a binomial
distribution Pr [ν | n,q= 1] = B(n,λ ) because the only investors who desire to exit
are those with a liquidity shock. If the project is unprofitable (q= 0), then ν has a
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binomial distribution Pr [ν | n,q= 0] = B(n,λ +(1−λ )µ), which is analogously
intuitive. Now those who want to exit are the investors with a liquidity shock and
the investors without a liquidity shocks who have monitored. It is easy to see that
Pr [ν | n,q= 0] has a greater success rate and hence leads to a larger demand for
exit. This means that the number of investors who elect to exit can serve as a noisy
signal of the probability of success for the project: if only few investors elect to
exit, the project is more likely to be profitable than when many investors decide to
do so.
Aggregating the previous conditional probabilities, we have that the uncondi-
tional number of investors electing to exit is randomly distributed according to






pλ ν +(1− p)(λ +(1−λ )µ)ν (1−µ)n−ν
]
(1−λ )n−ν
The conditional probability of success given the number of exit demands is:





pλ ν+(1−p)(λ+(1−λ )µ)ν (1−µ)n−ν
(5)
which is decreasing in ν (see chapter 2 for the derivation of both formulas). The
more people elect to exit the lower the posterior probability of success for the
project. This suggests that seeing many exit demands is bad news. This relationship
will be an important element of the analysis.
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3.3.2 Price on the secondary market
When exit is only possible through trade, investors may offer their shares for sale on
the secondary market. To eliminate the possibility for multiple equilibria, I assume
that, if indifferent, the investor holds on to his share. The number of shares offered
for sale is equal to the number of investors who elect to exit, ν . I assume that ν is
common knowledge, that is, that a competitive market maker sees the flow of offers
ν and determines the highest price that uninformed outside investors are willing to
pay for one share. The market price is hence equal to the expected value of the
shares, which in turn equal to R times the conditional probability that the project is





It is easy to see that other investors have no incentive to offer their shares for
sale. Since shares are traded for their expected value given publicly available in-
formation, uninformed investors are indifferent between selling and holding their
shares and we assumed that they always elect to hold. Informed investors (the
strategic sellers) earn information rents on the market, since they are selling shares
in a project they know is worth 0 but they obtain a positive price.
Liquidity sellers make a loss, due to the fact that, in expectation, the price is
less than the expected value of a project of unknown profitability, pR. This happens
because liquidity sellers sell projects irrespective of their profitability, hence they
sell shares of value pR, but outside investors discount the fact that strategic sellers
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adversely select the projects they put on the market and hence price shares at less
than pR in expectation. Adverse selection by strategic sellers causes liquidity sellers
to bear a trading cost pR−Eν>0 [P(ν,n)]> 0.
3.3.3 Liquidation and project profitability
The probability of liquidation depends on the exit modality. If exit is through trade,
the project is never liquidated and hence the probability of liquidation is equal to
0. If exit is only through liquidation, the probability of liquidation is equal to the
probability that at least one investor elects to exit:
Pr [ν > 0 | n] = 1−Pr [ν = 0 | n]
= 1− (1−λ )n [p+(1− p)(1−µ)n]
It is easy to see that other investors—those not experiencing a liquidity shock
and those with no private knowledge that the project is unprofitable—do not have
any incentive to demand the liquidation of the company. If ν > 0 the company will
be forced to liquidate by somebody else. If ν = 0, there is no investor who has
discovered that the project is unprofitable (or ν would not be zero) and hence, using
(5), the conditional probability of success for the project is
Pr [q= 1 | n,ν = 0] = p
p+(1−p)(1−µ)n
> p
Thus, the project’s expected returns are larger than pR> L and hence it is never
optimal to liquidate the project early. This shows that, as in the case of exit through
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trade, also when exit is through liquidation there are no runs—that is, no demand
for exit—by those investors who do not have liquidity or strategic motives to exit.
Things are more complex with redemption rights. Given a redemption price
equal to 1, the number of redemption requests motivated by liquidity or strategic
considerations is equal to the number of investors who want out, ν . If ν > νˆ , the
company cannot pay the redemption amounts out of current cash, becomes insol-
vent and is therefore liquidated. The probability of liquidation is thus Pr [ν > νˆ | n+ νˆ].
Since Pr [q= 1 | n+ νˆ,ν] decreases in ν , redemption sorts projects. Those con-
tinued are characterized by ν ≤ νˆ and have a higher conditional probability to suc-
ceed than those liquidated, which are characterized by ν > νˆ . That is:
Pr [q= 1 | n+ νˆ,ν ≤ νˆ]> Pr [q= 1 | n+ νˆ,ν > νˆ ] for all νˆ and n
On the one hand, uninformed inside investors can leverage on the sorting effect
of redemptions by holding on to their shares. If the project is not liquidated they will
know that the project has a relatively high chance of success. If instead the project is
liquidated, it is relatively unlikely to succeed. This suggests that uninformed inside
investors should refrain from redeeming their shares; by holding they can free-
ride on information held by others. On the other hand, conditional on liquidation,
redeeming investors share in the company’s cash and the liquidation value, while
all other investors only receive the residual liquidation value, which could generate
a run on the company. For the moment, we assume away the problem of runs. We
return to it in Section 3.5, where we show that runs can occur if the entrepreneur
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does not hold enough cash.
3.4 Liquidity versus control
In this section, I will unpack the effect of the different exit modalities on liquidity
and control within the organization.
3.4.1 Liquidity provision within the organization
Table 5 below summarizes the expected “price” that investors facing a liquidity
shock can obtain for their shares under different exit modalities. It is important to
recall that an investor with liquidity needs elects to exit irrespective of the prof-
itability of the project. With tradability, exiting investors obtain an expected market
price which is less than the expected project value because of adverse selection by
informed investors.38 This cost of trade decreases as the number of investors in-
creases, that is, the market becomes more liquid when the number of investors goes
up. When the exit modality is liquidation, the exit price is simply the liquidation
value of the shares, which, by hypothesis, is less than the initial investment.
If the exit modality is redemption, the exit price depends on the number of
redeeming investors as follows. If they are less than the available cash (ν ≤ νˆ),
redemption does not lead to liquidation and the redeeming investors obtain the pre-
determined redemption price, 1. When ν > νˆ , the available cash is not enough to
satisfy all redemption requests and the company is forced to liquidate. However,
38The expectation is calculated over all possible realizations of ν .
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since, by assumption, redeemers have priority over other investors, as long as cash
plus the total liquidation value are enough to satisfy the redemption requests—that
is, if ν ≤ νˆ +nL—redeeming investors obtain the full redemption price of 1. When
this is not the case, the available resources are shared pro rata among the redeeming
investors (with all other investors obtaining nothing from liquidation). The expected
exit price with redemption is larger than the liquidation value L, because investors
share in assets of per-share value equal to L plus some cash with unitary per-share
value, which is larger than L. In addition, the expected exit price with redemption
is less than 1 for the same reason (if the company only held cash and no assets, the
exit price would be 1).
Price of early exit
Tradability Eν≥1 [P(ν,n)]< pR
Liquidation L< 1
Redemption
L < ∑1≤ν≤νˆ+nL [Pr [ν | n+ νˆ]]
+∑ν>νˆ+nL
[




Exit through redemption provides therefore better liquidity than exit through
liquidation. The intuition is straightforward: the company is holding cash—which
retains its value over time—in addition to assets—which are productive in expecta-
tion over the long term but lose value in the interim period. Tradability may or may
not outperform redemption depending on the parameters. The exit price through
redemption is bounded above by 1. In contrast, with tradability, the exit price could
become very close to pR > 1 if n is particularly large, but could also be depressed
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below 1 when the cost of trade is large due to a small n. Therefore, liquidity is
highest with redemption if n is small and with trade if n is large.
3.4.2 Control within the organization
Within the model, the issue of control is essentially a question of continuation ver-
sus liquidation at date 3. In the first best, continuation is efficient if q = 1, while
liquidation is efficient if q= 0. No exit modality achieves the first best; inefficient
continuation needs to be balanced against inefficient liquidation. The loss with inef-
ficient continuation is L (because the project yields zero if continued) while the loss
with inefficient liquidation is R−L (because the project would yield R if continued
but is liquidated instead).
With tradability, all q = 1 projects are continued (there are no inefficient liqui-
dations), but also all q= 0 projects are, which is inefficient. If the exit modality is
liquidation, projects may be liquidated in both states of the world. Good projects
may be inefficiently liquidated due to an investor’s liquidity shock. This eventuality
becomes more likely when the number of investors n increases. Intuitively, since
any investor can liquidate the company, the more investors the larger the risk that
this occurs inefficiently. Bad project may be inefficiently continued if no investor
monitors and no investor experiences a liquidity shock. As n increases, the proba-
bility that a bad project continues goes to zero. In the extreme, with very large n,
liquidation rights result in inefficient liquidation with probability close to 1 and in
inefficient continuation with probability close to 0. This suggests that, with large
n, tradability and liquidation rights suffer from diametrically opposite problems.
121
While trade results in inefficient continuation of unprofitable projects, liquidation
rights result in inefficient liquidation of profitable ones.
If the exit modality is redemption, projects are sorted. If the project is profitable
(q= 1), redemption allows the company to absorb some exit demands without liq-
uidating. This is an improvement over liquidation rights, which result in liquidation
at the request of any investor. In contrast redemption rights result in liquidation
only if the redeeming investors are more than νˆ . Therefore, the probability of in-
efficient liquidation is lower than with liquidation rights, although it is higher than
with trade.
If the project is unprofitable, the opposite reasoning applies. Redemptions result
in more projects being continued than with liquidation rights and in less projects
being continued if compared with tradability.
Probability of Probability of
inefficient continuation inefficient liquidation
(given q= 0) (given q= 1)
Tradability 1 0
Liquidation (1−λ )n (1−µ)n 1− (1−λ )n
Redemption Pr [ν ≤ νˆ | n+ νˆ,q= 0] Pr [ν > νˆ | n+ νˆ,q= 1]
Table 6: Control
To sum up, with respect to inefficient continuation, trade has the worst perfor-
mance, liquidation is the best, redemption is somewhere in between. Instead, with
respect to inefficient liquidation, trade performs the best, liquidation the worst, re-
demption is again somewhere in between. The sorting effect of redemption yields
intermediate values of both type-I and type-II errors.
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Comparing the performance of the different exit modalities is straightforward.
It is easy to see that it is always possible to choose νˆ so that redemption rights
perform better than liquidation rights. At least, if νˆ = 0, the two modalities are
identical. Therefore, redemption is always to be preferred over liquidation.
The choice between redemption and trade depends on the parameters of the
game and, in particular, on the riskiness of the project, which is captured by the
probability of success, p, and on the prevalence of liquidity shocks, λ , which could
in turn be a proxy for the efficiency of the credit market.
With low p—these are high-risk, high-yield projects—trade performs very poorly
because inefficient continuationsweigh heavily on the balance. With high-p projects,
instead, trade performs well. We would therefore expect that risky projects be as-
sociated with redemption rights and safe projects be associated with tradability.
Similarly, the likelihood of a liquidity shock, λ , only negatively affects the per-
formance of redemption rights. Therefore, if λ is large, trade performs better and if
λ is small redemption performs better. This result could be interpreted as suggest-
ing that in settings where liquidity needs can be satisfied elsewhere—for instance,
through an efficient credit market—redemption rights are more likely to emerge.
The ex ante project value net of investment is accounted for in the next table. It
is easy to see that, keeping pR constant, the project value under liquidation rights
is larger when n, p and λ are small. Since redemption rights can be engineered to





p [(1−λ )nR+[1− (1−λ )n]L]
+(1− p) [1− (1−λ )n (1−µ)n]L−1
Redemption
n
n+νˆ p(Pr [ν ≤ νˆ,n+ νˆ | q= 1]R+Pr [ν > νˆ,n+ νˆ | q= 1]L)
+ n
n+νˆ (1− p)Pr [ν > νˆ,n+ νˆ | q= 0]L
+ νˆ
n+νˆ −1
Table 7: Project value net of investment
3.4.3 Summary
The previous analysis suggests that tradability will be associated with projects char-
acterized by large initial investments (large n), relatively safe but possibly moderate
returns (large p relative to R) and inefficient credit markets (large λ ). Vice versa,
redemption rights will be associated with projects characterized by small initial in-
vestments (small n), relatively risky but possibly high returns (small p relative to
R) and efficient credit markets (small λ ). In the next section, we will examine
the costs associated with redemption rights, which in turn will define the scope for
liquidation rights.
3.5 The costs of cash
There are two costs associated with the use of redemption rights. On the one hand,
to be effective redemption rights require companies to hold some cash. The amount
of cash held determines the likelihood that redemption requests will result in the
liquidation of the company. In the model, the need to hold cash requires the en-
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trepreneur to rise more initial capital than she would otherwise do if exit were al-
lowed either through trade or through liquidation. In turn, this may have direct or
indirect costs for the entrepreneur, such as a higher cost of capital or the risk of not
being able to find a large enough number of investors.
On the other hand, as we have suggested above, tradability and liquidation rights
are immune from runs. The intuition is that trade is a purely individual decision with
no consequence for other investors and takes place at a price that reflects available
information on the secondary market. Hence, uninformed investors with no liquid-
ity needs derive no benefits from trading. Conversely, liquidation rights perfectly
internalize negative information: if the project is unprofitable, investors with private
information will force the liquidation of the company to exit—because no other exit
option is available. Therefore, uninformed investors with no liquidity needs have
again no incentives to demand liquidation.
Redemption rights lie somewhat in between. The decision to redeem is private
but has possibly negative effects for other investors. The reason is that a redeemer’s
claim has priority over other investor’s claims on the company’s cash and assets.
Although somewhat extreme, this feature captures the idea that redemption rights
allow a redeemer to exit for a convenient price, which is possibly higher than the
liquidation value of the project. This generates the potential for runs, that is, creates
incentives for investors with no private information or liquidity needs to redeem
their shares. To show that this is a possibility, it is enough to focus on the outcome in
which all and only the investors with either a liquidity shock or private knowledge
that the project is unprofitable request redemption, while all other investors hold
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their shares. We need to show that this outcome may not be an equilibrium.
Since redemptions are placed simultaneously, we look for pure-strategy Nash
equilibria and focus on a representative uninformed inside investor with no liquid-
ity needs. We are interested in establishing whether the situation in which only
the ν investors with liquidity or strategic reasons to redeem do so and all other in-
vestors hold to their shares (including monitors who learn that the project is good)
is an equilibrium. If this is not the case, there can be a “run on the company’s
cash” equilibrium where (some) uninformed investors with no liquidity needs re-
deem their shares.
We focus therefore on the payoff of a representative investor who does not ex-
perience a liquidity shock and does not monitor. Recall that the entrepreneur has
collected funds equal to n+ νˆ at date 0. Only a portion n of these funds are pro-
ductive, while the remaining funds, νˆ , are held as cash and they do not yield or lose
value as time passes. In total, the company’s return at date 4 is nqR+ νˆ and the
company’s liquidation value at date 3 is nL+ νˆ .
If only ν investors request redemption, then the investor under analysis expects
to receive the following payoff if he holds his share
ΠH ≡ ∑ν=νˆν=0
(





n+νˆ−ν Pr [q= 1 | n+ νˆ,ν]R
])
+∑ν=νˆ+nLν=νˆ+1 Pr [ν | n+ νˆ]
nL+νˆ−ν
n
where the first summation captures the case in which there is enough cash to
satisfy the (genuine) redemption demands and the project is continued and, with
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some probability, is successful. In this case, the payoff at date 4 is equal to the
residual cash (νˆ − ν) plus the conditional expectation to receive R. Both residual
cash and returns are shared among the n+ νˆ − ν non-redeeming investors. The
second summation captures the eventuality that the redemption demands exceed the
available cash and the firm is liquidated. In this case, the non-redeeming investors
only share in the residual liquidation value of the company, after the redeeming
investors are paid. If ν > νˆ +nL the available cash and the liquidation value are not
enough to satisfy redeeming investors and there are no assets left to share among
non-redeeming investors.
If instead the investor redeems, then he earns
ΠR ≡
1













where the summation now starts at ν = 1 because the present (uninformed) investor
is redeeming. The first summation refers to the case where redemption requests
are honored; in which case the investor receives the redemption price of 1. The
second summation refers to the case in which the redemption requests cannot be
honored, in which case the investor receives his share of the available cash plus a
pro-rata share of the liquidation value. The condition for the no-run situation to be
an equilibrium is ΠH ≥ ΠR.



















Pr [ν | n]
nL
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which clearly results in ΠH < ΠR. If the company does not hold enough cash,
redemption rights may result in runs.
3.6 Conclusion
I have presented a simple model of exit from a company. Exit modalities balance
the need to commit capital to a project for the long term—which may generate
the risk of inefficient continuation of unprofitable projects due to managerial en-
trenchment—and the need to provide liquidity and control to investors—which in
turn may result in too many liquidations of profitable projects. The analysis has
contrasted three exit modalities: trade, liquidation rights and redemption rights.
I have shown that redemption rights are optimal when projects are risky, require
moderate amounts of initial investments (and the involvement of relatively small
groups of investors) and occur in an environment with relatively well-developed
credit markets (which can absorb most liquidity needs). In the opposite scenario,
tradability is the optimal exit modality. This also suggests that companies will
abandon exit through redemption and move to tradability as they move away from
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the initial, risky phase of investment and mature into larger, more profitable and less
risky endeavors.
Liquidation rights are, in general, suboptimal choices because of the risk of
inefficient liquidation associated with them but may be preferred when the cost
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First note that Pr [ν | q= 1] is the probability that liquidity sales νλ plus
strategic sales νµ add up to ν , conditional on q = 1. Note that there cannot be
strategic sales, because the project is profitable, so that νµ = 0 and νλ ∼ B [n,λ ],
where B denotes the binomial distribution. We have:






λ ν (1−λ )n−ν
= B [n,λ ]
Pr [ν | q= 0] is the probability that liquidity sales νλ plus strategic sales νµ add
up to ν , conditional on q= 0. Note that
(
νµ | νλ = i,q= 0
)
∼ B [n− i,µ], because
a strategic sale takes place only among those investors who are not subject to a
liquidity shock, so that
Pr
[








The distribution of vλ , instead, is unaffected by the realization of q, because
liquidity sales occur irrespective of the profitability of the project. Therefore, we
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have
Pr [ν | q= 0] = ∑i=νi=0
[
Pr [νλ = i]∩Pr
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which justified line 5. Pr [ν] is easily obtained by aggregating the preceding results
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over the probability distribution of q:

















pλ ν +(1− p)(λ +(1−λ )µ)ν (1−µ)n−ν
]
(1−λ )n−ν
Using Bayes’ rule and simplifying, we have:





pλ ν+(1−p)(λ+(1−λ )µ)ν (1−µ)n−ν
which proves the formula in the Lemma. The comparative statics is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First note that:











[pλ ν+(1−p)(λ+(1−λ )µ)ν (1−µ)n−ν ](1−λ )n−ν
= pλ
ν
pλ ν+(1−p)(λ+(1−λ )µ)ν (1−µ)n−ν
Buyers know that each seller on the market is either a liquidity seller, with prob-
ability λ




Liquidity sellers sell shares of value Pr [q= 1 | ν]R, while strategic sellers sell
shares of zero value, because they adversely select whether to put up their shares
for sale. Therefore, the price is:
P(ν) = λ





Using 1−Pr [q= 1 | ν] = Pr [q= 0 | ν] we have the expression in the Lemma. The










= sign [(λ +(1−λ )µ) (n+1)− (ν +1)]
which is increasing in µ and is weakly positive if
λ +(1−λ )µ ≥
ν +1
n+1














> 0 for all µ and ν; if, instead, λ > 1
n+1 , we will have that, for
sufficiently low values of ν , ∂P(ν)
∂ µ
< 0 if µ is small and ∂P(ν)
∂ µ
> 0 if µ is large,
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where the cutoff level is given by µ = ν+1(n+1)(1−λ ) −
λ
1−λ .
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Omitted.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. From the expression for Pr [ν | q= 0] in the proof of Lemma 1 it is easy
to see that Eν≥1 [P(ν) | q= 0] decreases in µ , limµ↓0Eν≥1 [P(ν) | q= 0] > 0 and
limµ↑1Eν≥1 [P(ν) | q= 0] = 0. Therefore, there exists a unique µκ such that µκ =
Cκ (µκ).






































whose comparative statics can be investigated by looking at the addenda in the
summation, which can be rewritten as:
pλ ν+1 (λ +(1−λ )µ)ν
pλ ν+1+(1− p)(λ +(1−λ )µ)ν+1 (1−µ)n−ν
(1−λ )n−ν (1−µ)n−ν
1− (1−λ )n (1−µ)n
R
Each of the addenda (and hence the summation) decreases in µ , which is easy to
verify by inspection. The expected exit price initially increases and then decreases
in n. To see why, notice that the summation’s addenda decrease in n. Hence in-
creasing n has a marginal and an infra-marginal effect: on the one hand, it adds
an addendum and, on the other hand, it reduces all previous addenda. The infra-
negative marginal effect becomes bigger as n rises and disappears as n approaches
0.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. It is easy to see that Cpi (µ) may exhibit discontinuities because µ affects
the cutoff ν , which in turn takes discrete values. However, it is easy to see that
Cpi (0) > 0 and hence Cpi (µ) first crosses µ from above (if it does) and a value µpi
exists such that all investors with ci ≤ µpi monitor because ci ≤Cpi (µpi).
Let us now examine the two components ofCpi (µ) in turn. The first component
(1− p)(1−Λ)(1−µ)n−1L
is evidently decreasing in p, λ , µ and n. In particular, it goes to 0 as µ approaches
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1. The second component is
(1− p)(1−λ )E1≤ν≤ν [P(ν) | q= 0]
and is clearly less than the exit price in a corporation (Lemma 4). ThereforeCpi (µ)
does cross µ from above and a solution exists.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using Lemma 4 an Lemma5, we have that if ν > 1, the monitoring level
is larger in a corporation because Cpi (µ) <Cκ (µ), which is evident by comparing
Cκ (µ) with the second line in Cpi (µ). If instead ν ≤ 1 and n is small, we could
haveCpi (µ)>Cκ (µ). To see why, consider that if n= 1, the expression forCpi (µ)
reduces to
(1− p)(1−λ )L
and we know by hypothesis that the liquidation value is greater than the exit price.
Therefore, for small n the monitoring level could be lower in a partnership, but this
is not necessarily the case because for n= 1 we could have P(ν = 1)> L and hence
ν > 1, so that the region in which Cpi (µ) >Cκ (µ) could be empty. For large n the
monitoring level is larger in a corporation and this region will be reached for some
large enough n, since ν increases in n.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Note that if n ↓ 1, we have Λ = λ , M = µ , (1−µ)n−1 = 1, and µκ ≤ µpi .
Therefore:













so that the value of shares is greater in a partnership than in a corporation. Note
now that if n ↑ ∞, we have Λ = 1, M = 1, limn→∞ ∑
ν=n
ν=1 (P(ν)Pr [ν])→ pR, and
µκ ≥ µpi .
limn↑∞Vκ = pR
limn↑∞Vpi = 0
so that the value of shares is greater in a corporation than in a partnership.
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